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1. Introduction  
 
An ecosystem (ES) is a group of plants, animals and micro-organisms in combination with the 
non-living physical components of their environment. All the biotic and abiotic components of 
ecosystems are interrelated and create  unique nutrient cycles and energy flows.  An ES may be 
considered a completely independent area with its own interdependent organisms (Flores and 
Abbasov, 2014). All the organisms in the ecosystems are interrelated and share same living space.  
ESs are the sources of many vital products and services used by human beings (Daily et al., 1997). 
They are the only sources of resources, which are very important to human wellbeing and survival 
(Costanza et al., 1997;, Flores and Adeishvili, 2011).  ES provided resources  include a broad 
basket  of goods and services used in people’s daily life  (Pearce and Atkinson, 1993). Goods and 
services provided by ecosystems  will be simply called “ecosystem services” or ESS. 
There are number of definitions of ESS. According to Schroter et al., (2005), ecosystem services 
(ES) are the conversion of natural assets – such as trees, snow cover, and soil fertility – into 
valuable benefits such as wood products, winter tourism, and arable land. ESS can be described 
as a “services provided by the natural environment that benefit people” (DEFRA, 2007: 10).  
Ecosystems provide services such as water supply, pollination, seed dispersal, climate regulation, 
water purification, nutrient cycling, and control of agricultural pests. Many flowering plants 
depend on animals for pollination, and 30% of human crops depend on the free services of 
pollinators”. 
According to The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment ( ), ESS can be  classified as provisioning, 
regulating, cultural and supporting services. 
Provisioning services linked to forests and grasslands refer to the human use of products. They 
can be identified as the quantifiable goods from ecosystems. Food, water, timber, honey, medical 
plants are considered as a provisioning service of ecosystems. They provide direct use values for 
societies. 
Regulating Services are the services that regulate natural processes. For example, forests 
regulate water flow in small streams and reduce risks of floods and droughts.  Regulating services 
may also provide food and diseases control through regulation of air quality and soil processes. 
Supporting services are directly related to the ecosystems and support living organisms providing  
them with shelter. These services  create  various types of use and non-use values for human 
beings. 
Cultural services include all types of non-use benefits such recreation and tourism. Cultural 
services may also include existence and option values. 
Natural resources should be used effectively and produce maximal gains for the society.  
Simultaneously, these maximal gains should not result in total degradation of the land and 
forests.   Because “maximal gains” have been often interpreted without reference to their 
sustainability, however,  they  should be  substituted by the notion of  “effective gains”. These 
are defined as the   effects that maintain sustainable ecosystem management and produce stable 
gains over long-term periods. These stable gains can even be much lower than usual and certainly 
than maximal gains, since the latter could only last for limited and typically short periods of time. 
In this respect, land users should  understand that maximal gains even over short term periods 
could result in a total degradation of the natural resources and loss of income sources forever. 
In view of growing concerns of related to ecosystem degradation, it is very important to develop 
ways that would enable to manage ecosystems in a more sustained way. In order to promote 
conservation and protection of natural resources and improve services provided by ecosystems, 
various types of market driven mechanisms can be  designed.  An important class of market based 
mechanisms is known as payments for ecosystem services (PES). Through PES landowners are 
supported financially to change their land use styles and provide ecosystem services to buyers. 
These buyers can be direct users or non-users t interested in improving  ecosystem services. 
Almost in all PES schemes, managers of natural resources and ecosystems are paid to manage 
their resources more effectively, protect land, biodiversity, carbon sequestration ability through, 
for example, replanting trees, reducing grazing and applying more nature friendly agricultural 
methods. 
 
2. Aims, Objectives, scope and methodology 
 
The overall aim of this study is  to collect valid and reliable information and identify opportunities 
for future PES markets in Azerbaijan and the target area, assess main opportunities for future 
PES markets and provide a roadmap to full PES study. This is an initial or scoping study that will 
primarily identify main opportunities for PES. 
 
Within  this broad theme, the study had a number of specific objectives: 
 to identify the existing ecosystem services of forest and high alpine grasslands in Ismailli 
and Shamakhi districts of Azerbaijan and classify them 
 to identify target groups, sellers and buyers for future PES markets 
 to collect the needed data for PES 
 Identify institutional and administrative functions/frameworks (who can be the body to 
manage the ecosystem services) 
 Develop pro-poor benefit-sharing mechanisms (mechanisms piloted to reduce over-
grazing and restore critical ecosystem services generated by healthy summer pastures 
(forests) in the Greater Caucasus Mountains. 
 Interlink PES with Pasture Users’ Associations and Forest Users’ Associations established 
in the region and identify income sources for PUA and FUA 
 Prepare and submit the final draft report with the road map for the year 2017 to 
international expert and to UNDP 
 To design WTP (Willingness To Pay) questionnaire of non-use values of  ecosystems for 
potential buyers and pretest it 
 
The methodology of the study is based on analyses and valuation of ecosystem services that 
will be developed fully  in a subsequent, larger scale application of the PES study.  
 
3. The PES System 
 
A Pes Typology 
 
Several types of PES schemes have been experimented with various degree of success all over 
the world. These schemes mainly include direct payments to landowners or their indirect 
support. Direct payments may include contracts between buyers (generally public bodies) and 
sellers (generally private parties), where buyers directly support service providers. Government 
subsidies, tax reductions, different types of programs through which farmers are financially 
supported to reduce soil erosion may be counted as direct payments. For example, a government 
program that is concerned with land degradation may provide financial support of landowners 
and help them to implement proper measures against land degradation. It may also be an 
experiment launched by government to find what types of land use patterns will provide more 
gains. Reverse auctions over the land use permits can also be counted as direct payments. In land 
use reverse auctions, government (or another buyer) purchases land use rights from the owners 
in an auction, where many landowners offer their rights at a bid price. Land use rights may be 
purchased through direct negotiations with landowners. Parties may agree on foregoing rights 
for fixed periods of time (usually for 10-15 years) to the buyer and use their lands only for specific 
purposes, though which sustained ecosystem management will be maintained.  
 
In some programs landowners are supported indirectly. Under indirect payments, for example, 
certain types of activities can be freed from taxes. Farmers may choose more sustainable 
activities through which land and ecosystems will be protected. For example, switching to 
beekeeping instead of cattle breeding in mountain regions can be supported by tax reductions.  
PES types may be private, public or cap & trade. In private PES parties directly talk to each other 
through agreements and contracts. The parties include landowners, government, charity 
foundations or companies that are interested to improve quality of ecosystem services.  For 
example, in private PES activities that are implemented in USA government and charity 
foundations directly support landowners. İn most cases buyers by use rights of lands and 
property rights remain in landowners.  
In some cases public PES schemes are similar to private PES schemes. However, publis PES 
schemes mainly come as subsidies or tax reductions. In these kind of schemes buyers may 
motivate landwoners through various kinds of  incentives  that include reduction of taxes, 
subsidies, and government purchases. 
Cap and trade  schemes can be considerd as indirect PES. For examples, land owners can be given 
quotas to water abstraction or pollution. Within the designed PES schemes these quotas may be  
subject to trading. These kind of PES schemes cannot be implemented in all countries. For 
examples, water quotas may be subject to trade only in countries with high water shortages, 
where a solid background of environmental laws exists (Table 1).    
 
 Table 1: Main PES types  
Main PES types 
Private PES Public PES  Cap and Trade 
 Beneficiaries directly pay 
to service providers 
 Involved private parties’ 
cost sharing 
 Buying of land and 
contract with former 
landowner 
 Fiscal mechanisms driven 
by government (e.g. 
Subsidies to land owners) 
 Public agencies involve 
member fees 
 Buying of land and 
changes use rights 
 Launch of maximum 
amounts for pollution and 
water abstractions 
 Water withdrawal and 
pollution permits 
 Maximum allowable use 
permits 




 Voluntary payments to 
PES funds 
  
 Trading with permits   
 
 
While the PES schemes may have various origins and forms, they all are directed to reduce human 
pressures on ecosystems using the way that could be reasonable and practical. PES schemes 
sometimes may deny some short-term gains of stakeholders, bringing benefits for all sides in  the 
long-term . In other words, PES schemes make ecosystem protection economically profitable and 
ensure sustainable use of resources.       
In most of developed countries several forms are successfully applied. Most used PES formulas 
have following patterns:  
 Government subsidies landowners to change land use type 
 Landowners supported to reduce grazing through rotational grazing 
 Landowners supported to reduce pasture grazing through special quotas 
 Landowners supported to reduce water withdrawals though water saving technologies 
 Landowners supported to change land use type 
 Purchase of land use rights through reverse actions for 10-15 years 
 
PES as a new market- environment friendly instrument  
 
The PES is a form of a contract1 that parallels, for certain aspects reproduces, and for other 
mirrors, the concession contract.  While a concession contract typically aims to promote the 
development of a natural resource or other public resource efficiently taking into account the 
public good, a PES has the objective of avoiding or restraining development of the resource in 
order to pursue one or more conservation goals. While the concession generates rewards to the 
holder through exclusive rights over the use of the resource, the PES seeks to limit the right of 
the owner or user of the resource, paying in exchange a compensation. In the case of PES, 
therefore, it is the government that is, in a certain sense the concessionaire, while the private 
party is the granter of the concession in exchange for a fee.  As shown by Scandizzo(2009) and  
                                                          
1 We refer to PES as a class of contracts  defined ( Wunder, 2005, 2008)  as: (a) a voluntary transaction where (b) a well-defined environmental 
service (or a land use likely to secure that service), (c) is being bought by a (minimum one) service buyer (d) from a (minimum one) service 
provider (e) if and only if the service provider secures service pro-vision (conditionality). 
 
Scandizzo and Ventura (2015) in the case of the concession contract, the form of “reverse 
concession” constituted by PES has a number of interesting properties and, while potentially 
advantageous for both the community and the private owners, should be handled with care. 
The first property of PES is that it seeks to align private and public incentives, recognizing the 
difference and properly charging the costs of the alignment to the public. In order to understand 
what is the possible role of PES, however, one does not have to limit oneself to imagine a pure 
transfer of payments to a set of private holders of rights over natural resources. Equally 
important, in fact, is the issue that privatized natural resource uses may have on the role of 
government. In this respect, a special position is assumed by the so-called “fundamental theorem 
of privatization”, stated in 1987 by two American economists (Sappington and Stiglitz). This 
theorem, which in a short period has become the basis of innovative thinking on the relations 
between property and enterprise, turns upside down the traditional approach that sees 
normality as the condition in which property is private and the regime change is constituted by 
the attenuation of private control in favor of the public authority. By considering the opposite 
hypothesis of transfer of rights from the public to the private sector, this approach proposes to 
identify the conditions under which a complete delegation of production decisions to a private 
concern is socially desirable. The basic idea of the theorem, which identifies some stringent 
conditions under which the above social desirability exists, is basically a PES system, that is, an 
auction mechanism whereby a certain number of firms compete to acquire the right to produce 
a good or a service, for which a relevant public interest exists. The auction mechanism ensures 
separation between the public concern (the “government”), which opens the auction, and the 
winner (the private concern). It is designed, however, in a way that makes compulsory for the 
winner to pursue one or more public objectives (for example, the production of a given amount 
of environmental services, the maintenance of the resource according to given standards). As a 
consequence, the winner, even though she is completely distinct from the government, shares 
with it the objective function, by virtue of the fact that of having won the auction, and having to 
deliver the objectives, conditioned to sustaining the effective costs, which are thereby minimized. 
According to the logic of the theorem, therefore, a PES system can be rationalized as a form of 
public intervention that preserves the separation of property from enterprise, which is 
characteristic of the capitalistic organisation of production. PES make in fact possible to privatise 
the pursuit of public interests, by  preserving private property rights and utilising at the same 
time  private concerns as the most efficient instrument of environmental conservation in a 
market economy. The conditions under which this perfect efficiency is achieved, however, cannot 
possibly hold in reality: they include, in fact, absence of risk aversion on the part of the firms, 
perfect competition, no transaction costs, no possibility of collusion, and perfect information. 
The authors suggest that the appropriate institutional response to the practical impossibility of 
achieving social efficiency through perfect delegation to the private sector is a process of public 
regulation of production.  
 
Accepting such a process as the best solution to the problem of achieving social efficiency under 
private ownership, two different economists, Laffont and Tirole (1989 and 1990), have put 
forward a more daring theory. According to this theory, the separation between property and 
enterprise in modern capitalism requires a particular regulatory environment because it is the 
result of an incomplete constitution. The constituents (the founding fathers), since they operate 
under a veil of ignorance, are unable to design a complete set of rules (a constitution) that 
predicts and describes costlessly all future contingencies. If they were able to do so, the economy 
would be composed of only private subjects, while constitutional rules would be reduced to a set 
of detailed instructions that the private subjects would have to follow. The only public subjects 
would be, in this case, the courts of justice, which would have the task to make sure that the 
private subjects followed the instructions as prescribed by the constitution. 
 
In the conditions of uncertainty that characterises the actions of the founding fathers, the rule 
that can be emanated cannot be detailed instructions, but only meta-rules, constraints and 
prescriptions of general type. Public agents are not any longer limited to the courts of justice: 
their role is more important precisely because their mandate is vague and does not include 
explicitly all the possible contingencies. One part of public agents (the bureaucrats) has the task 
to manage the lack of specific prescriptions. 
 
An organisational form, which in a stylised form can be described as consisting of four 
components, may represent the problem of reconciling public concerns and efficiency, under 
these conditions: (a) the firm, (b) the agency, (c) the founding fathers and, (d) the consumers. 
The firm is a private concern that operates according to the principle of maximum profit or, where 
applicable, the minimum cost. It is characterised by variable costs that are common knowledge, 
and by fixed costs, technology and effort levels known only to management. The agency is 
endowed with regulatory and control power based on the constitution and the related system of 
laws. It may involve property rights relative to the operations of the firm. For example, it may be 
assigned control rights for the firm, or discretionary power to concede or revoke the 
authorisation to operate, or to nominate or revoke the administrators. The main role of the 
agency is to make sure that correct information on the firm’s structure (technology, profits, 
benefits of managers and dependants) is passed on to the community. In doing so, however, the 
agency is tempted to collude with the firm, by sharing the advantages that can be gained at the 
expenses of the consumers. The agency thus receives a pay off only if its behaviour is beyond 
reproach both in terms of effort and in the lack of collusion with the firm. The founding fathers 
via legislation or executive action give the agency its mission and empower other organs of the 
judicial system to monitor and control its performance.  
 
As an exemplary application, Laffont and Tirole (L-T) analyse the prohibition, common to many 
juridical systems, to make transfers to public operations or to private firms operating under 
regulation, to cover their losses. When the activity faced by the firm presents increasing returns 
to scale, in fact, social efficiency implied by the so called marginal cost rule (which wants the price 
of the service provided to the public just enough to cover the service cost) requires the transfer 
to be made. Application of the alternative average cost rule, on the other hand, is compatible 
with the absence of losses on the part of the firm, but not with social efficiency. In the case of 
forests, this dilemma is exemplified by parastatal operations of various forms (Public Forest 
Administrations or PFAs), whose existence is justified by the fact that forests provide both private 
goods and a variety of externalities. Most of PFAs have indeed accumulated large losses, which, 
at least in part, can be attributed to their providing services over and above what mere private 
firms would provide.  
 
According to the L-T argument, however, substituting a combination of private concessions and 
PES to PFA’s operations would have the likely benefit to increase efficiency and avoid the 
collusion between the regulators and the firm (the parastatal operation or the concession 
holder). This would be achieved because the fact that PES de-couple the conservation payments 
from the management costs  would mean that the government cannot intervene to fill the 
difference between revenues and costs of the regulated firm and this  creates a conflict of 
interest between the consumers and other social groups and the possibly colluding regulators 
and regulated. Thus, consumers, grass-roots social, environmental and business groups may be 
motivated, if information costs are relatively low, while collusion costs are high, to control both 
the firm and the regulators to avoid collusion. This result may be mixed in some respect, but in 
its totality may have a greater efficiency than the usual bail out in the name of public interest. 
 
Governance issues: making good rules  
 
Given that an effective regulatory environment is crucial and that good laws may be more 
important than good organisations, how do we find the best rules to support PES? They may 
follow, in fact, many different forms and may be associated with different property regimes and 
institutional arrangements. Corresponding to these different forms, in forestry, grazing, fishing 
and other enterprises, the system of explicit and implicit rules regulating the various components 
of the activity establish the balance of power among the holders of rights that the activity 
generates, i.e. the so called stakeholders. To a lesser extent, these rules also affect the balance 
between the two key characteristics of stakeholders’ claims: liquidity and control. We can say 
that a regulatory environment is characterised by a good set of rules (i.e. by good governance) 
when these eliminate or, at least, reduce agency costs and transaction costs. Agency costs arise 
from the difference of interests between principal and agent, while transaction costs derive from 
the need to finance search and information costs and to control opportunistic behaviour. This, in 
turn, originates from taking the opportunity to indulge in hidden information or hidden action to 
improve one’s position in the implementation of a contract.  
 
In the theory of law and economics, the problem of the external and internal rules of an organised 
activity in the private domain has predominantly been addressed at the level of the relationship 
between shareholder and manager (or shareholder and creditor, in financial terms). 
Consequently, the current literature tends to focus on the interactions between holders of 
explicit and implicit rights and the enterprise, with particular regard to the maximisation of 
individual objectives, controls and opportunistic behaviour. To an extent, this issue is the indirect 
result of the emergence of an institutional form of dualism, inherent in the relationship between 
principal and agent. The fiduciary nature of this relationship, the presence of a conflict of 
interests and the failure to provide the same information to both parties causes a deviation from 
the boundaries of efficiency, which manifests itself as a rise in agency costs. Rational attempts to 
reduce these costs may take two forms: monitoring or the introduction of incentives ( via so 
called commitment mechanisms). 
 
Two basic premises underlie the process of monitoring. First, usage and benefit rights tend to 
become separated. Contracts make separate provisions for them in order to allow resource use 
to be determined by a different set of agents, than those collecting the benefits. This separation 
starts by granting the bulk of usage rights to one class of agents (e.g. sharecroppers, or tenant 
farmers) while benefits are shared, but corporate evolution has carried the process to its extreme 
conclusion  (Coleman, 1990)2 .   Second, the holders of usage rights tend to create an independent 
constituency or interest group, which opposes other right holders. This opposition is levied 
against any power of control given by a fiduciary relationship with the owners of the resource 
base involved (for instance, via side contracts, special privileges, customary rules, representation 
of  right holders). This latter notion does not only apply to the formal management structure. It 
also describes those figures who have acquired a portion of the powers of control through forms 
of negotiation other than shareholding. In the case of forests and forestry enterprises,  for 
example, these figures include prospective parties in informal agreements between various 
stakeholders (government bureaucrats, landlords, industrialists and commoners). 
 
PES can be seen as a novel attempt to bypass the separation between usage and benefit rights, 
by realigning the objectives of the two classes of stakeholders. PES in fact are paid by 
beneficiaries to actual or potential users to pursue specific objectives that would not be 
perceived in principle as being in the interest of the latter. However, incentives are also necessary  
in setting up PES contracts and organisations because monitoring is costly and can only go so far 
to reduce the agency costs. These arise from the fact that the holders of usage rights, as agents 
of the owners, tend to have their separate agenda, with possible conflicts with the holders of 
benefit rights.  Under these arrangements, private enterprises to manage natural resources are 
selected on the basis of  PES contracts containing  various incentives designed to reconcile private 
and public interest. These incentives are generally based on some notion of benefit sharing, and 
attempt to throw a participatory net over the main decisions and outputs expected from the 
contract. For example, an interesting new institutional arrangement “Collaborative Forest 
Management (CFM)”  has been tried (World Bank, 2001)  as “ … a working partnership among 
the key stakeholders in the management of forests and tree resources. Key stakeholders include 
local forest users and state forest departments as well as other actors, such as NGOs and the 
private sector.” By providing a contract framed by a broad mechanism of mutual commitment of 
the actors involved, CFM seeks to link sustainable forest management with the promotion of 
social justice. Again according to the World Bank, “… The central feature of CFM is control over 
                                                          
2 “… All corporate bodies  “split the atom” of whatever resources are vested in them, taking the usage rights and leaving to members or 
owners the rights to benefits from that use. “ (Coleman, 1990, p.457). 
the management, not just the use, of forest land and resources, with a devolution of power to 
local forest users.” 
 
CFM main commitment mechanisms may be classifies under two headings that both include 
some form of privatisation: user groups and joint management. User groups are formed by 
granting local people, organised as primary users and traders of forest products, some decision 
power on how forest resources will be managed and utilised. Institutional arrangements attempt 
to provide contracts and decision mechanisms that generate agreement on forest use with other 
community members and governmental assistance and assurance of long-term benefits. Joint 
management arrangements provide for sharing the rights to manage forest resources between 
the local community and the forest authority. Local people not only have rights to harvest some 
forest products, but share management rights with government officials and jointly evaluate the 
performance of the partnership, the problems incurred, and the possible violations perpetrated.  
 
While these commitment oriented mechanisms are slowly being tried by several countries, and 
high monitoring costs are being sustained, governance in the forestry sector remains 
unsatisfactory, in part because of the complexity of usage and non usage rights to forestry 
resources. Because  residual rights have typically been vested onto the public sector, traditional  
usage rights have involved, in addition to the right of harvesting the trees for lumber, wood for 
fuel, fruits, game and amenities. These rights have been granted either through concessions, 
sales and auctions for services, or through customary rules. In the former case,  explicit contracts 
are the primary source for governance rules. In the latter case, more common for non timber 
products, usage  and governance rules tend to merge into implicit contracts expressed as codes 
of behaviour, mutual expectations and social norms.   
 
Governance rules, furthermore, are not always followed, as illegal and rent seeking behaviour 
often threatens to jeopardise the rights of weak stakeholders, by imposing upon them extra costs 
or by depriving them of the access to the resource. Forest crime (illegal logging, arson and the 
smuggling of endangered species) is a problem all over the world and is particularly severe in 
developing countries. In Cambodia, for example, this problem was so severe that in 1997 the IMF 
suspended a support program for the failure of the government to collect more than 100 million 
$ of revenue from the logging industry.   
 
An important characteristic of PES  thus depends on its governance aspects. All contracts, 
whether they are explicitly stipulated or only implicitly expressed as mutually accepted rules and 
obligations, are variously subject to default and different types of breach and elusion. As a 
provider of a framework of discipline and recognised rules for all contracts, governance is an 
important component of local capacity to implement efficient contracts, but it may itself be the 
casualty of transgression and misbehaviour. In the case of  PES, good governance requires 
transparent award policies. In most cases, however, the granting bodies may be the exclusive 
domains of government bureaucrats and industry lobbyists, while the participation of civil society 
may be lacking. Tender and auction systems, which have successfully been introduced in many 
countries, also lack a satisfactory, legally binding contractual anchor and a naturally enforcing 
environment. Corrupt and unfair practices to award and supervise concessions are widespread, 
and abuses by government officials, local bureaucrats and concession holders are a constant 
feature of public ownership and management of users rights. Most countries have passed 
legislation on environmental protection (e.g. the Zambia Forest Act)  and in other countries (e.g. 
most OECD countries and Papua New Guinea and Indonesia among the DCs), environmental 
management plans are developed in lieu of forest concessions. Nevertheless, bad contractual 
practices and illegal behaviour still dominate the performance of the public sector as the main 
motor of governance rules for forestry. 
 
Because they are not the consequence of formal contracts, usage rights for non-timber products 
are even more vulnerable to abuses and illegal behaviour. In many cases competing claims are 
advanced by different groups, which may try to enforce them through both legal and illegal 
means. Except were the forests are under the strong control of an established community, 
governance structures appear weak and vulnerable to special interests, when the resource is 
publicly owned. In Brazil, for example, the Amazon forest has a plurality of legal users, among 
which the indigenous population is by law endowed with special rights and privileges. In reality, 
for many years the forest has been at the mercy of the migrant farmers practising “slash and 
burn” agriculture and of the large “rancheros”, who seek clear land to raise their livestock. 
 
In most “frontier” cases, governance is to be the main problem faced by government, and trying 
to couple secure property rights with public good commitment to private agents through PES 
appears to be the best way to ensure co-operation and commitment to a rational use of natural 
resources. On the contrary, when the government is at the same time the owner and the 
regulator of the resource use, the ensuing conflict of interest lowers the credibility of public 
bureaucracies and may itself induce corruption and other abuses.  An example of this conflict of 
interest is again the concession contract, which is a form of privatisation of control, while the 
government retains residual rights and broad supervision responsibilities. Under these conditions 
it is not surprising that concessions are characterised by several distortions, such as non 
transparency, discretionary granting and negotiating, as well as the pretence of completeness 
that contrasts with the uncertainty of harvest, resource use and sustainability.  
 
To a large extent PES can be seen as a new form of contract in lieu of concessions, because of the 
failure of the latter to reconcile public and private interests. The “Collaborative Forest 
Management “(CFM) contracts are examples of PES as commitment mechanisms to encourage 
co-operative behaviour on the part of the various stakeholders involved. Other contracts, based 
on project financing or  more sophisticated economic agreements are also being tested together 
with new regulatory institutions. A recent example of this new wave of contracts is given by  the 
experience of a local NGO, the Centro de Suporte Tecnologico, operating in the state of Oaxaca 
in Mexico. This organization , through the use of several trust funds, the involvement of local 
communities and local business, has been able to implement an ambitious water management 
and reforestation program. The program is based on the innovative idea to provide PES as a form 
of adequate compensation to indigenous and peasant communities for environmental services 
that offer tangible benefits to downstream users. The new contracts and institutions 
experimented may consist of complex arrangements, whose immediate success or failure may 
be largely a function of the context or the circumstances. Their ultimate functioning, however, 
will depend on the development of a new class of customary rules and social standards.  
 
Social standards are at the base of many clauses stipulated under PES contracts and, in the 
absence of specific stipulations, they act as norms of last resort to regulate usage and non usage 
rights for commons such as forests, grazing lands and water bodies. While a precise definition is 
difficult, social standards can be seen as key features of contracts that involve reciprocal 
obligations of competing parties, by stipulating that contingent rights be distributed by 
partitioning them into two parts. These are: the part below a given level of risky entitlement (the 
primary claims) and the part above such a level (the residual claims). In particular PES may be 
embodied in  a contract where a private stakeholder, by committing itself to specific conservation 
practices, takes the  residual claim on the performance of a commons based enterprise, while 
the public party maintains the primary claim. In this case the level of payment in every period 
represents a threshold for the income that the  holder of the PES contract would earn in the 
absence of her obligation to perform the conservation services: if such an income is below such 
a threshold the residual owner can satisfy her obligation and exercise her claim to the payment.  
If the opportunity cost of satisfying the contract is above its payment, on the other hand, the 
primary holder is better off by not abiding by the PES contract obligation and, as a consequence, 
she has the option to become the primary claimant.  
 
Because the private party has the option to exit the contract, should her opportunity cost become 
larger than the payment, PES contracts are subject to moral hazard and, if assigned competitively, 
to adverse selection. This is because the private parties willing to enter the contract will offer a 
more competitive price, the larger is potentially their pay off from abandoning it once the PES 
proves to be lower than the alternative income they could gain by not abiding to the conservation 
practices dictated by the contract. The design of a PES contract is thus a very delicate affaire, 
which requires not only legally binding agreements, but also appropriate incentives of personal 
and social nature. In general, these incentives may be more appropriately identified by 
considering the PES as a form of agreement that depends on the specification of a social standard. 
This means that a PES is a stipulation that a private party has the right to exploit and manage a 
given enterprise, for all states of the world, provided that she performs a certain number of tasks 
in line with the common good in exchange of a payment which is a social standard. This standard 
may be a minimum threshold (such as a poverty line under which commoners would use the 
resource disregarding conservation) or a maximum limit (such as a pollution quota). Accordingly, 
the contract may provide that an appropriate compensation be extracted from the benefits 
accruing to one claimant or set of claimants to improve the condition of another set. Thus, the 
PES as a  social standard can be seen as a way of specifying a socially desirable distribution of 
benefits and costs for a variety of stakeholders. 
 
Social standards are rapidly changing for commons all over the world  (Scandizzo and Knudsen, 
1980, 1996).  Tropical forests, for example, were considered for long time as “empty lands” to be 
penetrated and colonised (Nelson, 1973). As a consequence, standards of exploitation were 
broad, lax, and uncontrolled. They focused on timber cutting and access for slash and burning 
agriculture. Competing claims were typically regulated by state ownership, customary rights and 
brute force. Temperate forests, even though less prone to reckless exploitation, were also subject 
to threats by conflicting users, mismanagement and lack of short-term incentives to investment 
and maintenance.  
 
More recently, however, the situation appears to have taken a turn for the better, with social 
standards being extended to sustainability, efficiency and environmental services. This change is 
also at the base of the interest for a new deal with the private sector aimed at internalising the 
drive for social efficiency within a set of incentive-compatible contracts, of which PES are the 
most notable and popular form. In addition to a renewed interest for the concessions as a way 
to involve private interests without giving up the ultimate control of the public good aspects of 
forests, PES are acquiring increasing importance as an instrument of privatization through 
participatory management. As for other government assets and enterprises, the transfer of 
property rights to the private sector involves the moulding of an institutional environment, where 
liberalisation and governance rules are  crucial concurring policies  
 
PES Typologies and Environmental Valuations 
 
As a system of payments whose effectiveness depend on costs and benefits of the parties 
involved, PES design and implementation are crucially linked to the issue of properly valuing the 
environmental services to be provided. In this respect, contractual typologies become relevant.  
Wallow et al (2009) distinguish between contractual arrangements  (CRES), compensations  (CES) 
and rewards (RES) for ecological services . They define these three categories as follows:    “ CRES 
are contractual arrangements and negotiated agreements among ecosystem stewards, 
environmental service beneficiaries, or intermediaries, for the purpose of enhancing, 
maintaining, reallocating or offsetting damage to environmental services.”  A particular CRES 
contract or negotiated agreement will include a compensation or reward instrument or 
combination of instruments: 
“Compensation for Environmental Services” (CES) are payments or other forms of restitution 
made to environmental service beneficiaries or ecosystem stewards to offset foregone 
entitlements to environmental services or ecosystem stewardship benefits.  
 CES1—Compensation to environmental service beneficiaries for socially disappointing 
damage to ecosystem services by ecosystem stewards. This includes self-organized deals 
between stewards and beneficiaries, restitution payments ordered by intermediary 
organizations, and compensation payments made by intermediary organizations. 
 CES2—Self-organized contracts, negotiated agreements or tradable allowance and 
permit systems that facilitate exchange of environmental service entitlements among 
environmental service beneficiaries. This includes cap-and-trade systems for emissions 
and conservation concessions. 
“Rewards for Environmental Services” (RES) are inducements provided to ecosystem stewards to 
give them incentive to enhance or maintain environmental services. 
 RES1—Rewards to ecosystem stewards for foregone stewardship rights or reduction of 
threats. This includes self-organized deals between ecosystem stewards and 
environmental service beneficiaries, public programs of reward made on behalf of 
beneficiaries and eco-labeling and certification schemes for products generated through 
good stewardship practices. 
 RES2— Rewards to ecosystem stewards for undertaking extra investments or 
management practices that restore or enhance the ecosystem. This includes self-
organized deals and public programs of reward. 
 
Dixon and Pagiola (2001) distinguish between biological resources and biological diversity, where 
the former refers to a gene, species or ecosystem, while the latter refers to the variability of the 
resources. This first distinction is necessary to achieve a suitable green accountancy which can 
contribute to the normal accounting system of an economy and, on its basis, enhance a series of 
interventions and investments for the preservation of the biodiversity. The difficulty of the 
evaluation can result in an inadequate management of the ecosystem and consequently in a 
scarcity and tended extinction of ecosystem services (Liu et al 2010 ), but it can be attenuated by 
distinguishing several evaluation components and evaluating each  of them separately. This is 
typically done by considering biodiversity Total Economic Value (TEV), which can be decomposed 
into the use value, including direct, indirect and option value and non-use value, including 
bequest and existence value. Table 2 shows a synthesis of several methodologies developed to 
“valuate”, i.e. to assign specific values, to ecosystem services. 
 
Table 2: Valuation Methods 
 Source: Brander et al 2005. 
 
4. PES as a program to create opportunities: the real option point of view 
 
 Introduction 
Unlike conventional instruments of agricultural policies, such as tax relief, subsidies and 
extension programs, PES aim at empowering the policy stakeholders: farmers, villagers and other 
operators from the government and the private sector. Rather than focusing on productivity 
increases for selected  agricultural goods, PES systems concentrate their attention on the 
potential of stakeholders, their individual capabilities and the improvements that can be obtained 
by upgrading their skills, enhancing their management capabilities and integrating production 
and conservation activities.  By expanding stakeholders’ opportunities, PES thus create “real 
options”. This is a relatively new concept in economics which has proven very useful to identify 
and quantify the opportunities created by successful development programs.   In analogy with a 
financial option, a real option is defined as the faculty, but not the obligation, of undertaking a 
given action at a pre-determined cost. This definition is simple and operational and does not seem 
to depend on uncertainty, irreversibility or the other special characteristics that are generally 
invoked (see, for example, Pindyck, 2000; Damodaran, 2002, ). By identifying  a separate class of  
claims , that , at the same time, do not create  counterpart obligations, its implications also shed 
new light on key concepts of law and economics, such as  empowerment, vesting of rights and 
stakeholders. Contrary to the financial option, a real option does not necessarily depend on a 
formal contractual relation, but on a commitment of resources without the possibility of full 
recovery. Such a commitment, which in the case of PES is constituted by the fixed payment to the 
farmers,   creates a sunk fund, with no apparent opportunity cost (bygones are bygones). This 
virtual fund has a counterpart in the voluntary adoption on the part of the farmers of a series of 
practices and training activities aim to integrate production and conservation. The  virtual fund 
created by  PES has thus a potential value, since it constitutes a capability to explore future 
opportunities in management and investment.  It is this potential that generates new options as 
added faculties of the participants to the program.  
Historically, the concept of option value derives from two sources both from environmental 
economics: (i) potential future benefits , according to a notion first introduced by Weisbrod in 
1964, whereby option value may be conceived as  an insurance premium one may be willing to 
pay to ensure the supply of the environmental good later in time; (ii)  the  value of the information 
gained by waiting,  analyzed in a  series of studies conducted in the ‘70s (Cicchetti, Fisher and 
Krutilla, 1972; Arrow and Fisher, 1974) and strictly linked to the twin concepts of irreversibility 
and uncertainty. This latter value was denoted as of “quasi option” to distinguish it from 
Weisbrod’s concept, which seemed to hinge more on demand characteristics such as willingness 
to pay and   subjective risk premiums. The two concepts, however, are both included in the 
dynamic definition of option, which was started with Black and Sholes’  famous paper (1972) and  
has gradually gained acceptance among the economists ( Dixit and Pyndick, 1994). According to 
this definition, a real option combines a stochastic process ( an evolving phenomenon such as soil 
degradation or climate change under dynamic, time dependent uncertainty) with an irreversible 
commitment of resources.  As Table 3 shows,  an  irreversible action (for example an investment)  
destroys a waiting option, and may create new options (to expand, to grow, etc.). Both types of 
options can  be  decomposed into two separate  values, concerning, respectively, information 
(the value of waiting )and  opportunities and threats ( the value of a contingent asset) . In both 
the case of the waiting option, and the options created, valuable information may be gained by 
observing the states of nature as they occur,  but  in one case, information is obtained from 
waiting, while in the other from acting.   Both types of options present also a component linked 
to their nature of a contingent asset, that is the value derived from  opportunities and threats. In 
the case of the waiting options, however, this component has the nature of a risk premium (the 
higher the downside risk, the higher the value of waiting), while the contingent value of the 
options created by the action lies in the capabilities created by the action, i.e. the potential 
response to exploit opportunities and avoid danger. 
 
 Table 3. Options created and destroyed and their components 
 
 Main Options destroyed by action 
(e.g. investment) 
 Main Options created by 
action   
Future states of nature Information from waiting Information from observing 
the action 
Opportunities/Threats Risk premium Response capabilities 




Real Options and PES 
 
Formally, a real option is defined as the ability (or faculty), but not the obligation, to undertake 
an action with uncertain future benefits through an immediate commitment of available 
resources. Real options values are related to the concept of capability, a notion introduced  by 
the economist Amartya Sen,  which in our context can be defined as a person’s opportunity and 
ability to undertake different actions that in turn depend on personal skills and external factors. 
It follows that the availability of real options can be expanded through investments in both 
human and non-human capital. In the case of PES, stakeholders join voluntarily a program  that  
promises to pay them a given amount in exchange for their compliance to a set of practices. 
These include  investments that may not only be undertaken in pursuit of direct benefits in terms 
of goods and services, but also to build capabilities of various sorts. These include in turn the 
ability to manage production and conservation activities and to  respond to an uncertain future, 
i.e. to equip the actors involved with capabilities to flexibly respond to unexpected changes in 
their environment. The PES design and implementation, therefore, aims to build   a strategy 
consisting of both more effective choices to act on the nexus between the environment and 
production  but also of provisions to be able to act flexibly in the future. 
 
A robust capability/real option strategy rests on finding the right balance between the 
risk/benefit of taking early action with deferring decisions and thereby keeping options open, as 
well as building the capacity to react to future uncertain circumstances. The Real Options 
Strategy allows for analyzing adaptability and related build up of capabilities rather than being 
limited to estimating the cost/benefit ratio of PES programs . In an uncertain environment, 
options and capabilities can be displayed in different forms according to circumstances that can 
be foreshadowed only imperfectly and whose probabilities are unknown or on which there is 
disagreement among stakeholders. The value of options (adaptation measures) and the 
likelihood of farmers and other actors exercising them vary across farmers according to their 
information, risk aversion, endowments and beliefs.  
 
The value of a real option depends on five key factors: 
(i) the expected value of the benefits from exercising the option (called in analogy with 
financial options the “underlying” value), 
(ii) the cost of the resources  to commit to exercise the option (again in analogy with financial 
options named the “strike” value), 
(iii) the amount of benefits per year sacrificed by holding the option, i.e. by postponing its 
exercise (the “dividend”), 
(iv) the  discount  rate, measuring the opportunity cost of time (the return foregone by 
committing the resources required to exercise the option), 
(v) the time of expiration, i.e. the time after which the option cannot be exercised any longer, 
An important parameter that follows from the estimation of the option value and 
depends on the  five factors above is the hurdle rate. This defined as the multiple of 
exercise cost (e.g. the investment level) that the underlying benefit has to reach for the 
option to be exercised. Before an action is undertaken, the corresponding option to act is 
said to be “held” and “alive”, while once it is undertaken, it is said to be “exercised” or 
“dead”. A real option can be created explicitly through a contract as an agreement 
between two (or more) parties, or it can arise implicitly from circumstances.  Joining a PES 
program   for a farmer can in itself be considered a real option that, if exercised, can create 
or destroy other options (including the option to wait and  join the program later in the 
same or modified form). A common way of learning about options and capabilities is to 
identify the capabilities already held by farmers in the form of human and/or non-human 
capital as well as to estimate the value of options (adaptation measures) already 
implemented by some farmers.  
 
For PES to be effective in creating options to farmers and their communities, a number of specific 
investments have to be implemented at both farmer and institutional level. These investments 
concern enabling activities and include actions such as research, experimentation, information 
and training, that are non-farm specific, but are needed to address some of the main constraints 
limiting adaptation and increasing capability. Investments should also include the direct 
implementation of projects with the objective to experiment and demonstrate alternative 
options for conserving the environment and  adapting to climate change. Most of these projects 
can be expected to have positive net benefits, but their major effects would be to create the 
critical capabilities that would enable farmers to  improve management of natural resources, 
conserve the environment and adapt to climate change for a broad range of its possible 
outcomes. 
 
In the context of PES, four general types of options can be created: (i) coping options that 
address the damage caused by transitory adverse events; (ii) rebound options that concern 
actions to recover and gain strength from negative developments/events; (iii) opportunity 
options that are related to taking advantage of opportunities from market developments,  
environment modification and  climate change; and (iv) adaptation options designed for 
permanent changes in  the environment as a consequence of past practices and  in response to 
climate change. These options are identified with reference to farmers’ response to the different 
impacts, which range from an unexpected anomaly in temperature and rainfall such as drought 
or flood (coping options), to discontinuous recovery from extreme events (rebound options), to 
exploiting new opportunities from shifting weather patterns and atmospheric CO2 concentration 
(opportunity options), to long term responses to changed economic fundamentals caused by past 
environmental practices ( or lack thereof)  and climate change (long term adaptation options 
such as population movements, shifts of economic activities, abandonment of agriculture and 
forestry). These options form a continuum of capabilities-opportunities, are context specific and 
have to be interpreted flexibly (what is one person's coping could be another person's rebound).  
An important element of the real option theory is to distinguish between expansion-contraction 
options, growth options, flexibility options and abandonment-suspension options. They may be 
present to various degrees in the options created  by PES programs. Further it is inherent in the 
real options theory to classify options in terms of the underlying capability of stakeholders to 
implement them. An option is only available to a farmer or community if the means to implement 
it are at hand. 
Related to all these options is the central concept of the Option to Wait. Because of their nature 
of contingent claims (i.e. faculties that can be exercised sooner, later or never based on the 
decision maker’s  analysis of circumstances), all options embed the faculty to wait in the sense 
that they can be held rather than being exercised immediately. The option to wait means that 
before committing resources to respond to a change, whose size, duration and properties are 
uncertain, farmers or institutions can wait to acquire more information on the persistence of the 
observed changes in order to establish if it  is economically justified to invest in actions designed 
to respond to the change. By waiting, it is possible to learn more about the characteristics of the 
change and design a better response, which should aim at creating new options to face an 
uncertain future.  When resources are irreversibly committed through an investment under 
uncertainty, the waiting option is destroyed but new options may be created, which may 
themselves be held or exercised. The option to wait is closely related to expiration time, i.e. to 
the time that the farmer can afford to wait before losing the opportunity to exercise the option.  
When a given investment is considered for adoption, “the option to wait” is taken into account 
by comparing net expected benefits with investment costs multiplied by a “hurdle rate.  As 
defined above, this is a multiple of the investment cost whose size depends on uncertainty. The 
greater the uncertainty about future value added from the investment, the greater the hurdle 
rate necessary to convince the farmer to undertake the investment. 
It is clear that the waiting option is more valuable, the wealthier a farmer is and the more 
diversified his/her income is. A wealthier farmer can afford to wait and see until the cost and 
benefit of an option is better understood and the hurdle rate has gone down. A poor farmer is 
much more exposed to risk than a well-endowed farmer, as a failure for the poor farmer may 
result in famine while the better off farmer can afford taking a risk.  Thus, the expiration time of  
her option to wait will generally be much shorter than for a richer farmer and in general her 
option to wait will have lower value because  she will give   a higher weight to the present as 
compared to the future (i.e.  a poor farmer will generally have a higher discount rate than a richer 
one).  This implies, for example that the coping option, which is very closely related to survival, 
may offer very little waiting time to a poor farmer while it could be substantial for well endowed 
farmers.  These farmers also hold considerably higher waiting power with regard to rebound and 
exploitation options, which should be made available to less well off farmers by government 
providing them with adequate resources. 
A good  strategy on the part of government might therefore be to help poor farmers overcome 
the risk element through accepting the risk and compensating them for failure, but demand that 
they themselves meet the cost (or part of the cost) of the investment, should the proposed  
measure or practice be successful. An example of such a strategy is offering a PES program where 
some of the payment works as a form of insurance, with farmers being compensated for damages 
if the recommended practice or investment is not successful, but are required to pay a premium, 
which may be subsidized for poor farmers, if success is achieved.  At the same time it is clear that, 
in order for many poor farmers to avail themselves of options that have proven to be 
economically justified, many would need access to credit to be able to avail themselves of such 
options and that the ability to access credit in a flexible way is itself a key option. It thus follows 
that a strategy of low resource commitment3, learning and acting flexibly is suggested by the real 
option approach and that a PES system may have a a central role in creating options at farm and 
community level. 
Projects and investments designed and appraised with the methodology based on the Real 
Options Theory have proven to result in much larger benefits than traditional cost/benefit 
estimates when they are associated with building capabilities4. The traditional project design and 
the related appraisal through cost/benefit analysis, in fact, are only aimed to increase and 
evaluate the expected NPV of the investment undertaken. The Real Options methodology adds 
the value of the options created and deducts the value of the options destroyed. In relation to 
investment choices, project design and appraisal, the Real Options methodology can thus be seen 
as embodying capability building in terms of human and non-human capital. 
                                                          
3 Under high uncertainty, a strategy that is especially relevant for poor farmers is to maintain resource commitment (i.e. 
irreversible investment) as low as possible, so as not to risk  wasting critical resources by over-reacting to threats under 
insufficient information ,  and expand such commitment gradually as more knowledge becomes available. 
4 Examples of real option applications to capability assessment and real options, see:  Winter Nelson et 
al. 1998, Ford, D. N., Lander, D. M. and Voyer, J. J. (2002) Dobes( 2009), Scandizzo (2010, 2011) . 
  
 
 With respect to  environmental damage and climate change, and in particular in responding to 
its uncertain long-term consequences in terms of timing, intensity and location of its impacts, 
the capability/real options strategy should be a crucial component of any adaptation strategy, 
since it allows for investing in adaptability rather than in mere adaptation. 
 
The case of water resource projects : evaluation and the water supply conundrum 
 
Virtually all regions of the world are witnessing a shift in perception and policy directions on  the 
construction of new infrastructure to increase the availability of water and enhance its quality 
for all users. This shift is due to a combination of events, among which three phenomena stand 
out for saliency and economic significance. First,  demographic and economic growth has 
increased more than proportionally the demand for water in all its uses. This has occurred in part 
because of the increasing requirements for high quality water for direct consumption,  but also 
because  water saving technological change for agricultural and industrial uses has been has not 
compensated for the growth of production in these sectors.  Second, water has been generally 
priced  much below its opportunity cost, especially if social costs associated to such phenomena 
as depletion and pollution are taken into account. As a consequence, serious problems  have 
developed of deterioration and reduction of water as a  stock of natural resources, and of its 
renewable capacity. Its increasing scarcity has been dramatized by shortages and temporary 
suspensions of supply, so that perception by the public has increased as to the fact that providing 
water to a set of stakeholders in many circumstances may not be considered a net benefit, but is  
a zero sum game, where communities and also private parties may undergo significant damages 
through negative environmental externalities. Third, climate change has injected a further 
negative element into the picture, by threatening the environment with more frequent droughts, 
higher volatility of rainfall, and   extreme events such as  water shortages and floods.  These 
phenomena appear still to be evolving, but they clearly contribute to render more precarious , 
less reliable and socially more costly both the present mode of exploitation and the traditional 
form of investment in water resources. 
Climate change (CC) raises also the question as to the capability to adapt of individuals and 
communities by saving water, and by developing more economic models to exploit water 
resources in  ways different than in the past. As far as we can tell from the studies developed so 
far, CC appears to have the peculiar property of both reducing the traditional forms of water 
supply, and of reducing the holding capacity of land  and of both natural and artificial reservoirs5 
                                                          
5 It does so by reducing rainfall, concentrating it in a smaller number of days during the year 
and increasing the frequency of droughts and floods, 
. Thus, CC not only may reduce economic growth, but it threatens to reduce also collective 
wealth,  by lowering the amount of water resources available, the capacity of land and 
infrastructure to hold them and the adaptability of individuals and communities in the face of 
these negative external effects, that can largely escape  the reach of markets and effective 
policies. 
While market failure has been a prominent feature of water management in the past , its effects 
have accumulated over the years and are being aggravated by CC evolution. All over the world,   
disputes and litigations are increasing among different users,  but also potential conflicts , a 
threat not matched by an increase capability to govern water resources, are growing. The reasons 
for this dynamic failure are several, but two of them appear particularly important. First, the need 
for reallocating water to reflect changing economic conditions which is not met by a 
correspondent expansion and diversification of water markets.  Second, among natural 
resources, water generates a range of reciprocal externalities that are very difficult to capture 
and internalize into market mechanisms. Furthermore, these externalities are a function of rights 
and faculties, i.e. they depend on the distribution of capabilities of different users, whose claims 
over resources is directed or mediated by various forms of water supply.        
For example, surface/groundwater connections tend to produce two distinct externalities: (i) 
surface water  can recharge aquifers via canal seepage and/or in-field percolation. Groundwater 
pumpers  thus develop   un-priced  claims on the water that passively seeps from canals  through 
an unsaturated area hydraulically  disconnected from the canals themselves . As a consequence, 
groundwater users’ capability increases and they become the recipient of a one way externality; 
(ii)  surface water can be hydraulically connected to groundwater, in which case a reciprocal 
externality materializes, since the pumping of groundwater increases canal seepage and ,given 
the water temperature differential between canal and groundwater, ultimately increases water 
supply capabilities both for  pumpers  and canal users.  Note that whether these reciprocal 
externalities become positive or negative may depend on  the capability of the recipient rather 
than of her counterpart user. For example, a given rate of seepage may be a positive externality 
if the capability of the groundwater user includes a lower water table and  sufficient drainage, 
but becomes negative if the raise of the water table is such that  soils are saturated and crops 
damaged .  CC may , however, dramatize these differences and reverse the causal direction: for 
example,  if canal water shortages is exacerbated by higher pumping, this may result in the 
lowering of water table, an unsustainable way of increasing water supply at the expenses of the 
overall capabilities of all users. 
The reciprocal relationship existing between surface and ground water users is perhaps the main 
source of market failure, as well as  of the failure to recognize, in traditional agricultural policies, 
the externalities implied by the fact that the capability of water supply is both the source and the 
consequence of the distribution of rights (and faculties) over water. The perspective of real 
options in this respect appears particularly illuminating. The two groups of stakeholders : surface 
water users (SWUs) and ground water users (GWUs) hold different options on water as a natural 
resource.  SWUs hold the faculty to capture the water through canals and convey these water in 
the aquifer by seepage or drainage, thereby determining a level of usage that in turn determines 
GWUs’ level of the aquifer, as well as water supply . GWUs, on their part, hold the faculty to use 
the water supply by pumping more or less intensively the water available as a consequence of 
the degree to which the SWUs exercise their options. Without  markets to regulate users’ prices, 
the exercise of the two interdependent options is a function of the vagaries of the distribution of 
rights. When SWUs sell water rights to a distant city, for examples, GWUs are bypassed and the 
implicit value of their option is reduced without compensation. Conversely, when GWUs exercise 
their option and pump water beyond the sustainable rate, depletion of the aquifer may follow 
depreciating GWUs’ capability.  
When  these conflicts are  recognized in traditional policies through cost benefit analysis and 
shadow pricing, PES can make a more effective attempt to take them into account. For example, 
according to the traditional approach, an increase in domestic  water supply  in an urban center 
is appraised by considering as benefits the value of the incremental consumption of water priced 
with final users’ willingness to pay  and, as costs, in addition to investment outlays, the 
opportunity costs , i.e. the value of the output foregone by agricultural users.  The real option 
methodology , however, suggests that traditional shadow pricing is not sufficient, since external 
effects do not concern only present but also potential water usage under alternative, future 
states of nature. Thus, benefits should also include the options created through the increased 
capability of urban water supply to satisfy local users under alternative scenarios, emergencies 
and (uncertain) outcomes of different source. At the same time, costs should include the options 
destroyed through the reduction of irrigation capabilities of both SWUs and GWUs  by depletion 
of the aquifer, lowering of the water table, salinity and other forms of contamination and 
deterioration of the water quality(Scandizzo, 2008, Scandizzo and Notaro, 2008). 
Reciprocal externalities constitute a global problem in evaluating water supply policies and 
projects (P/P).  Not only  ground water aquifers and surface water irrigation sustain each other, 
but also different areas of surface irrigation are closely interdependent. Climate change makes 
these connections more dramatic since existing hydrological equilibriums are challenged by the 
collapse of basic  links and  the creation of new, unexplored  pathways within a very complex 
network of waterways, canals and wells.  Because of the increasing unreliability of water supply, 
conflicts among holders of different claims are to be expected to multiply and increase in 
intensity as well.  P/P appraisal cannot afford to ignore  hydrologic externalities not only as they 
are deployed by different users and producers, but also as they develop as a consequence of the 
redistribution of capabilities determined by the joint effect of  market failures and climate 
changes. 
PES that foster watershed planning and water resource management are an important example 
of real options related to environmental challenges. While a good workable knowledge  exists of 
the physical processes that drive the hydrologic change, non stationarity implies that the past 
hydrological records is a poor guide to construct models that accurately forecast the future 
conditions of the watershed  (Hashimoto et al., 1982) and that a much wider range of information 
is needed in addition to water fall data, such as  data on stream flow , soil moisture, groundwater, 
snow pack, and glacier measurement  . Especially hard is the challenge to translate  climate 
changes into  watershed changes and these  into changes in hydrologic response for some of the 
processes with long lag times, such as deforestation-reforestation or groundwater depletion. 
In this context of increasing uncertainty, dominated by climate change and the perspective of 
major shifts in hydrological patterns (Carter, 1996),   PES may  be a key ingredient to create 
capabilities for water management and water supply strategies that adjust over time and balance 
risks.  For example,  hazardous watershed conditions are characterized by  different threats such 
as wildfire hazard, flooding or debris flow hazard, soil erodibility, and water uses . These threats 
can be countered by  PES designed to build up knowledge,  experience and skills that create 
specific  options to prevent, to defend, to conserve and to modify the natural environment of the 
watershed.     
 




Capabilities and options are abstract concepts and can be difficult to understand and apply in 
specific cases. They can be used as the main components of relevant scenarios only if their 
definition comes from the stakeholders involved. The reasons for constructing scenarios by 
interacting with the stakeholders are several. First, defining who the stakeholders are, and what 
is their degree of participation and empowerment, is already a way to find an effective first 
boundary for the PES design. Second, because contingent wealth relates to property or access 
rights of specific agents, or sets of agents, scenarios that are predicated on capabilities and 
options can only be defined in terms of these agents. Third, stakeholders are defined as agents 
who may hold claims against the PES in question. Once identified, they may have the most 
interesting and useful knowledge to the design the PES itself, as well as on the surrounding 
environmental, historical and political conditions. Finally, the interaction of the analyst with the 
stakeholders and among the stakeholders, with the analyst acting as a facilitator, may generate 
new valuable information and awareness on the PES potential and on the options open to the 
stakeholders themselves. 
Identifying the stakeholders is an important step. In general, stakeholders will include various 
government ministries and bureaus, as well as possible beneficiaries, both positive and negative, 
of the PES program in question. On one hand, the number of stakeholders should be as small as 
possible, as the boundary of the analysis should be defined by the immediacy and the relevance 
of the claims actually or potentially held against the PES examined. On the other hand, this should 
not deter the analyst from choosing a panel of agents, who may have something to say because 
they represent in a more general way the interests involved. In this respect, the choice of 
stakeholders should incorporate the Delphi technique, which is based on the idea that experts 
and representatives of the civil society should be consulted to define future scenarios. 
Representatives of important economic, environmental, and cultural sectors should thus be 
consulted and their opinion and views checked through an interactive and iterative process , until 
a consensus is reached on a scenario or a range of scenarios. 
 
Eliciting scenarios and narratives 
 
A critical element to involve the stakeholders in an active definition of the scenarios is their 
interpretation of reality through narratives elicited in several rounds of conversations.  If we think 
of a PE.S system necessarily including climate change prospects, in particular, these narratives 
can be used, in the course of a PES project design, to explore the main options to adapt, as well 
as the corresponding capabilities, through  opinions and viewpoints of the people involved. These 
are important both to elucidate the critical areas where the greater risks and opportunities are 
believed to be located and to identify the most important capability gaps for environmental 
management and adaptation. In particular, once the main stakeholders had been identified, 
formal and informal interaction (Knudsen and Scandizzo, 2005)  can be used to elicit objective 
information and opinions. The interaction concerns the context as well as the main features of 
the trade off between production and environmental management, as well as the adaptation 
process to climate change, as perceived and rationalised by stakeholders, on the basis of 
narratives3 and stylised facts obtained both from participative interviews and systematic survey 
techniques.  
 
Narratives should be collected to   illustrate the main points of view of the stakeholders, but  also 
as a way to organise their thoughts amid the controversies on natural resources and 
development among different experts, policy makers and political parties (Scandizzo, 2009 a, b) 
. As a consequence, they can be expected to be scattered throughout a wide range of perceived 
data, interpretations and opinions and to be largely complementary,  dwelling on different 
aspects of the problems investigated and thus not incompatible with one another. They will also 
be taken to illustrate how the same pathologies of under-development and environmental 
degradation are interpreted differently, both from the point of view of the diagnosis and the 
therapy, under alternative cause-effect models, historical representations and ideological 
assumptions. 
 
Table 4  shows  some of the narratives  collected , that could be the base to design a PES system 
for Azerbaijan, and for an experimental area in particular. The narratives are organised according 
to four components (i) a story as a succession of events over time, (ii) a series of perceived threats 
that are already implicitly contained in the display of the story, but can be singled out in more 
detail as a specific set of scenarios to be feared for the future, (iii) a series of opportunities that 
are perceived as possibilities to overturn the negative tendencies of the past (as expressed in the 
generally dismal recounting of the past) or as possible ‘lucky breaks’ that can materialise if things 
turn out well than predicted, (iv) a set of options, defined as faculties that may be acquired as a 
consequence of specific actions, in response to the threats and the opportunities presented. 
 
The narratives presented are conceived to be the base to design a PES system empowering the 
stakeholders to implement a series of activities that are both environmentally friendly and 
economically efficient. They are thus action oriented, as they correspond to the points of view of 
stakeholders who are active in agriculture and rural development, and they generally agree in 
presenting a stark picture of deteriorating resource base and impoverishment of the rural 
population. The narratives, however, are remarkably different in their recounting of the salient 
features of the recent evolution of agriculture. These differences tend to reflect political 
ideologies, but also alternative interpretations suggested by professional beliefs, social 
commitments and a variety of individual experiences. As for climate change (CC), it is interesting 
to see how its notion tends to be interwoven as an aggravating factor in all accounts of   resource 
degradation and increasing poverty. Also remarkable, amidst all the dissonances of the different 
narratives, is the consensus on CC main characteristics, which virtually in all interviews were 
identified as increases in: (i) average temperatures, (ii) variability and/or irregularity of rainfall, 
and (iii) frequency of droughts and floods.  
 
Table 4. PES Possible Objectives: narratives on threats, opportunities and options 
 
Narrative main plots Threats Opportunities Options that could be 
created by PES 
The curse of modern 
agriculture: 
 Loss of agro-biodiversity; 
 Inflexible agricultural 
practices; 




 Soil erosion and 
desertification 
 Irreversible loss of 
land races and 
traditional 
techniques; 
 Mismatch between 
cultivation 
techniques and 
changes of soil 
structure and water 
regimes; 
   Mismatch between 
cultivation 
techniques  and 
changes of season 
caused by CC; 
 Higher irregularity of 
rainfall 
 Seed banks; 
 Re-generation of 
traditional varieties; 






 Farm level 
experimentation 
 Redirect selection 
based on traditional 
varieties; 
 Boost research on 
appropriate 
biotechnologies; 
 Rehabilitate farmers 
towards more flexible 
agricultural practices; 
 Introduce appropriate 
water management 
techniques/improve 
the existing ones 
 
The effects of the oil 
economy: 
 Agricultural migration 
linked to the raise of the 
urban economy and the 
Dutch syndrome; 
 Loss of traditional 
agricultural skills; 
 Loss of agro-biodiversity 
and increase in food 
imports; 
  Diffusion of purchased 
and GM seeds; 
 Increased use of 
purchased inputs and 
water 
 Population growth 
and  land tenure 
problems; 
 Education systems 
neglecting 
agricultural 
knowledge and rural 
traditions; 
 Diffusion of television 
causing alienation 
from the traditional 
values of the rural 
communities; 
 Younger generations 
moving out of 
agriculture 
 Rising temperatures 
and dwindling water 
supplies; Loss of 
resilience and 
knowledge of local 
communities 







 Fine tuning of 
cultural operations 
and wise usage of a 
diverse mixture of 
local varieties; 
 Modernization (i.e. 
higher land 
intensity of the 
cropping patterns) 
 Higher levels of 
training; Educational 




the farmers to 
purchase  machinery 
and to manage the 
commons; 
 Creating local value 






special emphasis on 
youth and  women)  
 Urban agriculture 
 
Urban bias and loss of 
human capital: 
 Feminization of farming 
and loss of critical skills 
caused by  agricultural 
migration; 
 Degradation of soil and 
territory maintenance; 
 Low prices for 
agricultural products due 









 Lowering of the water 
table; progressive 
salinity of water; 
 CC as an aggravating 
factor, especially for 
drought prone areas 
 Liberalization of 
marketing 
activities; 
 Modernization of 
cropping patterns; 
 Rehabilitation of 
mountain slopes; 








techniques and CC 
risks 
 Improvement of the 
governance structure; 
 Training and human 
capital formation; 
 Ensuring remunerative 
prices for farmers 
Property rights and market 
power: 
 Agricultural growth 
stifled by land tenure 
problems, t lack of 




 Insecurity of land 
tenure for peasant 
farmers; 
 Population growth; 
 Loss of income to 
absentee renters ; 
 
 CC aggravating the 
conditions of  poor 
and landless peasant 
farmers 
 Investment in post-
harvesting activities 




 Diversification of 
cropping pattern; 
 Improvement of land 
tenure security 
 
The livestock economy: 
 Domination of livestock 
(especially  sheep) 
production as a profitable 
cash crop   
 Domination of livestock 
as an investment and a  
liquid asset in agriculture 
 Exceeding land 
carrying capacity 
 Overgrazing 
 Loss of opportunities 
of modernization 
through the 
expansion of fruits 
and vegetables 
 Use livestock as a 
vehicle for 
modernization; 
 Encourage intensive 
animal husbandry 
(reduce the number 
of animals and 
increase unit 
profit); 
 Discourage migrant 
patterns of 
production; 
 Create local value 
chains by investing 




 Rehabilitation of 
mountain slopes; 
in processing and 
marketing; 
 
The evolution of 
agriculture : 
 Diffusion of part-time 
farming; 
 Men’s migration; 
 Older people and women 
increasingly dominating 
agriculture;  
 New generations aiming 
to find employment 
outside agriculture; 
 CC accelerating this 
movement 
 Increasing erosion of 
the land and the 
water base; 
 Deepening poverty; 
 Environmental 
damage and CC 
making agriculture 
unreliable as a source 
of livelihood; 




 Use migration and 
outside 






 Training for non-
agricultural jobs; 
 Marketing and post 
harvesting activities; 
 Cooperation among 
farmers to exploit 
scale economies in 
mechanization and 
marketing 
Women in agriculture: 
responsibilities without 
power: 
 Crucial role of women in 
the rural communities;  
 Rural women have little 
power in socio-economic 
decision-making 
processes; 
 Rural women lack of 
adequate education, 
skills and tools to 
efficiently manage and 
perform agricultural 
activities 
 No advances in the 
rural women socio-
economic conditions; 
 Failure of the 
empowerment 
process; 
 Increasing health 
risks; 
 CC aggravates rural 
women’s plight; 
 CC causes further 
impoverishment of 
rural women 
conditions given their 
lack of knowledge of 
traditional cultivation 
techniques 
 Improve rural 
women capabilities 
and education level; 
 Develop rural 
women capacity to 
efficiently cope 
with future CC 
uncertainty; 
 Raise rural men 
awareness about 
the importance of 
women’s role in 
agriculture; 
 Improve future 
development 
projects’ design and 
management at the 
institutional level 
 Constant training for a 
long-term sustainable 
empowerment of rural 
women on farming 
practices, water 
management 
techniques, health and 
environmental risks; 
 Involvement of rural 




contributions to rural 
community; 








Key criteria that are needed to enhance PES effectiveness include (OECD, 20102): 
1. Removing perverse incentives: For a PES programme to produce effective incentives, 
conflicting market distortions, such as environmentally harmful subsidies, should be 
removed. 
2. Clearly defining property rights: The individual or community whose land use decisions 
affect the provision of ecosystem services must have clearly defined and enforceable 
property rights over the land. 
3. Clearly defining PES goals and objectives: These help to guide the design of the programme 
and enhance transparency. 
4. Developing a robust monitoring and reporting framework of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services. 
5. Identifying buyers and ensure sufficient and long-term sources of financing. The article 
'How to attract PES investment from private business?' examines how much private 
companies are prepared to invest in PES schemes for tropical forests and what can be done 
to motivate them. 
6. Identifying sellers and target ecosystem service benefits: Accounting for spatial variation in 
ecosystem service benefits via economic valuation, benefit scoring, and mapping tools 
allows payments to be prioritized to areas that provide the highest benefits. If the PES 
budget is limited, this can substantially increase the cost-effectiveness of the program. 
7. Establishing baselines and target payments to ecosystem services that are at risk of loss, or 
to enhance their provision: A PES program should only make payments for ecosystem 
services that are additional to the business-as-usual baseline. 
8. Differentiating payments based on the opportunity costs of ecosystem service provision: 
PES programs that reflect the cost of an alternative action that must be avoided (e.g. 
deforestation) to as to enhance ecosystem service provision are able to achieve larger 
ecosystem service benefits per unit cost. 
9. Consider bundling or layering multiple ecosystem services: Joint provision of multiple 
services can provide opportunities to increase the benefits of the program, while reducing 
transaction costs. This is clearly demonstrated by the article 'Bundled' PES schemes to 
boost cost-effectiveness'. 
10. Addressing leakages: Leakage occurs when measures to enhance ecosystem services 
provision in one location leads to increased pressures for conversion in another. If leakage 
risk is expected to be high, the scope of the monitoring and accounting framework may 
need to be expanded so as to detect, and consequently address, leakage. 
11. Ensuring permanence: Events such as forest fires may undermine the ability of a landholder 
to provide an ecosystem service as stipulated in a PES agreement. If the risks are high, this 
will impede the effective functioning of a PES market. 
12. Delivering performance-based payments and ensure adequate enforcement: Payments 
should be ex-post, conditional on performance. When this is not feasible, effort-based 
payments (such as changes in management practices) are a second best alternative, 
provided that changes in ecosystem management practices will bring about the desired 
change in service provision. 
The importance of stakeholder inputs for the design and implementation of PES are 
demonstrated in 'Future agri-environmental schemes need co-ordinating across landscapes' as 
well as the need to develop tools and policies for improving PES design. The article 'An alternative 
conceptual framework for 'Payments for Environmental Services on offer' describes a 
framework, incorporating the social aspects of PES, which can be used by practitioners, such as 
governments, to design and implement a variety of PES schemes. At a global level, PES is 
prominent in the discussions under the Convention on Biological Diversity on resource 
mobilisation for biodiversity3. One such mechanism is the potential role of REDD+4 in providing 
biodiversity co-benefits. 
Recognized as an important implementation tool, the role of PES schemes has been promoted in 
the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 20205, and their potential is further highlighted in the Roadmap 
for a Resource Efficient Europe (COM(2011)57)6. Regarding Parties' commitment under the 
Convention for Biological Diversity to substantially increase financial resources from all sources, 
the Strategy recognises the need for increases in public funding, but also the potential of 
innovative financial mechanisms, including PES. There are ongoing reforms within the EU where 
PES can play an important role, in particular, agri-environmental schemes in the CAP (Common 
Agricultural Policy) reform and similar support payments in the proposed European Maritime and 
Fisheries Fund. The establishment of Green Infrastructure is another areas where PES could 





6. A PES System for Azerbaijan 
 
 The Effectiveness of the Present Agricultural Policy 
 
In Azerbaijan, agriculture accounts for about 5% of GDP and 37% of  employment. The present 
regime of government intervention is based on tax exemption, credit and input subsidies and 
direct subsidies to farmers for production of wheat and paddy. Indirect (and perhaps unintended 
subsidies) are also present. For example, pasture land is rented out by municipalities on very 
favorable terms to migrant herders, compared with opportunity costs in terms of forage at 
market prices. From the point of view of a sustainable pattern of production, the combination of 
population pressure, general subsidization and unregulated land and input use appears to have 
resulted in severe damage to the environment. These include a high and progressive level of soil 
erosion, salinization of water for irrigation, extensive deforestation. These phenomena are 
correlated as they all depend on various forms of market failure. In the case of Azerbaijan this 
appears to be due to the underdevelopment of the market system, still lacking an adequate value 
chain connecting producers to consumers.  It also depends on the inability of traditional markets 
to price natural resource inputs such as water, pastures and forests.  As a consequence, the price 
system in agriculture does not reflect either the national priorities for production and food 
security, nor the opportunity cost of natural resources.  Producer prices tend to favor natural 
resource intensive and  environmentally detrimental activities such as  extensive animal 
husbandry and wasteful irrigation, while they provide little incentive for diversification and 
resource conservation.  
Animal husbandry activities, consisting mainly in the raising of sheep through grazing may be 
already past the land carrying capacity in the case of many mountain pastures, which are grazed 
so intensively that they appear to be past their maximum sustainable yield. In practice, this 
means that the carrying capacity of the land is being exceeded and that the only way to revert to 
a sustainable situation would be to reduce the number of animals. On the other hand, this simple 
prescription is difficult to implement because livestock still represents by far the main means of 
investment in agriculture, and the only asset that can be easily turned into cash for a farmer. 
Without a parallel development of an adequate market infrastructure and a network of local 
industries, therefore, the economic advantage of livestock production will remain too high to be 
challenged in the name of a sustainable production system. While the rationale behind these 
agricultural policies is not always clear, the most recent evolution of economic theory has pointed 
out that taxes and subsidies have to take into account their  costs and benefits both through 
direct and indirect effects on the economy. These effects impact not only production, incomes 
and consumption, but also, more importantly, human capital and capabilities involved in 
agriculture. 
 
Capability and PES design 
 
Capability, or the quality of being capable, (Sen, 1984,1990, 2002, 2005) is an essential 
component  of any policy measure, yet it is typically neglected  in policy evaluation both in scope 
and  extent.  All policies  can be considered the attempt to steer the commitment of scarce 
resources  towards a specific  direction  in the hope of future benefits.  These benefits, however, 
include both expected benefit flows, and power over future resources. For example, subsidizing 
wheat production  may be expected to bring benefits to  producers not only through lower costs 
and higher revenues,  but also in terms of an expanded range of choices and  enhanced business 
opportunities. This second, empowerment component, can be considered a form of contingent 
wealth, since its value will depend not only on the expected  benefits from  an average scenario, 
but also on the wider range of alternatives to which the policy may give access . Thus, for 
example, subsidizing production by increasing access and use of local varieties may  recover 
traditional methods of cultivation, increase the possibilities for diversification and improve the 
resilience of the farming systems , ultimately enhancing farmers’ capabilities. Similarly, 
subsidizing agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, agricultural machinery and credit, as in the case 
of Azerbaijan, can be justified as an attempt to cultivate farmers’ capabilities in the choice and 
the use of the modern technologies, ultimately achieving increases in efficiencies and well being 
that go beyond the mere increases in income from enhanced production efficiency.  
The policies to promote environmentally friendly and sustainable agriculture can themselves be 
considered an attempt to build a specific set of capabilities, more than a set of  direct targets in 
terms of reduction of environmental damages.  Compared with the traditional objectives of taxes 
and subsidies policies in agriculture, however, their nature is at the same time more pervasive 
and more indirect. Environmentally friendly agricultural practices (EFAP), in fact, cut across 
production sectors and input use, as they may require different techniques of production, as well 
as the reduction of some products and the expansion of others. As a consequence, implementing 
EFAPs requires  a reconstruction of agricultural capabilities and this in turn implies a re-thinking 
of the whole set of agricultural policies and, in particular, of the system of taxes and subsidies. 
The link between policies, choices and capabilities can be illustrated with reference to  the so 
called logic framework models. These models,  which have  been used for several years  in project 
selection (Maclaughlin and Jordan, 1999),  investigate investment impact through narrative or 
graphic descriptions of the processes that projects originate . The models analyze these processes 
as  sequences of cause and effect relations and   identify  both the underlying assumptions  and  
the actions that are planned to achieve the results desired. A typical approach (McCawley, 2010)  
of  a logic model distinguishes inputs, outputs and outcomes , defined respectively as resources 
needed (inputs), and results expected in terms of both instrumental  products (outputs), and 
benefits and costs (outcomes). In the case of  EFAPs, application of the logical model would thus  
account for the results of  the measures in terms of expected increases in incomes, consumption 
and other measurable outputs, separating these effects from the increases in  capabilities. These 
may involve conservation techniques both for traditional and new activities,  and  adaptability, 
i.e. the capacity to face environmental difficulties, natural disaster and  climate change with 
greater resilience and lower vulnerability.  
Application of a logic framework  suggests that the fact that policy  benefits and costs that  have 
traditionally been evaluated as  expected incomes and consumption, rather than as increases in 
capability ,  can be largely ascribed to a confusion between policy output and policy outcomes. 
Whereas  output can be conveniently measured by the increases in flows of goods and services 
that  the policy allows or helps to achieve,  outcomes involve more fundamental variables that 
can only specified via a theory of change. These variables may include stakeholders’ power over 
resources, their standing in terms of wealth and prestige, and their  confidence, flexibility and 
resilience in facing an uncertain future.  An increase in capability may thus consist of several 
outcomes that may be associated with an increase in expected  economic flows , since it 
corresponds to a more radical change in the way of being of stakeholders as economic and social 
subjects.  As Table 5 shows, using the logic model differentiation, we can re-interpret policy 
outcome components as formed of two broad categories:  (i) the changes in stakeholders’ 
capabilities (i.e. their ability to generate valuable outcomes by seizing opportunities and avoiding 
risks), and (ii) the changes in the options available to them as a consequence of the policy  . The 
table demonstrates that a consistent correspondence may be created between classes of inputs, 
outputs, capabilities and options, which, in a world of uncertainty, all contribute to the success 
(or failure) of the policy. 
 
Table 5 : The logic model as a framework for capability changes in agriculture 
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The application of the logic framework implies that agricultural policies cannot be evaluated in 
isolation, but should be combined with ecological and social policies both in design and 
assessment. This means that the structure of subsidies should be such as to steer the agricultural 
economy in the direction of sustainable and environmentally friendly agriculture, and , at the 
same time, that specific resources should be devoted to conservation and other direct 
environmental objectives. From the point of view of farmers and other agriculture operators, 
agricultural policy measures should be seen as a system to build up their capabilities to adapt, 
innovate and re-construct farm management practices in the direction of a more balanced and 
virtuous relationship between production and conservation goals. 
 
PES in Practice 
 
The majority of OECD countries engages in payments to farmers to induce them, on a voluntary 
basis, to adopt environmentally friendly  farming practices as well as direct conservation 
measures. These programs, characterized as PES (Payments for Environmental Services) 
recognize the potential nature of agriculture as a production and conservation activity, which can 
provide, at the same time, goods and services for the market and the environment.  The typical 
PES offers a single payment in exchange for a voluntary commitment to follow a set of 
environmentally friendly practices, and, in some cases, of conservation activities. The practices 
may include reduced tillage, limits on fertilizer and pesticide usage, limits on grazing and usage 
of natural resources such as water, forest land and wild life (Table 6). 
 
Table 6a. Payments for Farming Practices in OECD Countries (Vojtech, 2010) 
 
  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
EU  EUR 
million  
5133  5527  6118  6525  5620  6809  
Norway  NOK 
million  
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Table 6b. Payments for Farming Practices in OECD Countries (Vojtech, 2010) 
 
Farming Practices  Payment characteristic 
- Land improvement;  Indirect payment (Investment subsidies) and 
PES 
- Payment for nitrate reduction;  PES 
- Nutrient management plan;  PES 
- Extensive crop and livestock production;  Disincentives to land intensive animal 
husbandry amd PES 
- Organic farming;  Subsidies and PES 
- Integrated production wine, fruits and 
vegetable;  
Subsidies 
- Integrated farming;  Subsidies and PES 
- Traditional methods of cultivations;  Subsidies and PES 
- Reduced tillage/Mechanic weed control;  PES 
- Crop rotation;  PES 
- Bilological plant protection measure;  PES 
- Green manure crops;  Subsidies and PES 
- Green set asside;  Subsidies 
- Cash crops, green/winter cover;  Subsidies and PES 
- Extencsive management of all land;  Subsidies and PES 
- Extensive grassland management ;  Subsidies and PES 
- Convention of arable land into grassland;  Subsidies and PES 
- Grassland/biodiversity/habitat schemes;  PES 
- Biodiversity (local breeds);  Special projects and PES 
- Protected environmentaly sensitive areas;  Subsidies and PES 
- Lanscape elements;  Subsidies and PES 
- Maintaing and improving groundcover;  Subsidies and PES 
- Water conservation;  Subsidies and PES 
- On-farm Enery Conservation.  Subsidies and PES 
Payments for land retirement:  Subsidies and PES 
- Long term set-aside;  Subsidies and PES 
- Afforestation;  Subsidies, specia; projects and PES 
- Conversion of farm land;  Subsidies and PES 
- Converting pasture to perennial veg  PES 
 
While PES systems are gaining increasing currency in agriculture, they face two major challenges. 
First, a single payment does not recognize the heterogeneity of the farmers involved and may 
thus display low cost effectiveness in policy implementation. Second, the voluntary nature of the 
system, combined with low monitoring and enforcing capacities, makes it vulnerable to 
opportunistic behavior and various forms of contract failure. In particular, since farmers and 
government officials have asymmetric information on the nature, extent and effectiveness of the 
practices involved, compliance may be reduced by opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
farmers, through hidden information and/or hidden action. 
More generally, PES can be considered a form of private-public partnership (PPP) akin to a 
concession, where, however, it is the private party that voluntarily relinquishes, for a fee (the 
fixed PES) part of its property or user rights, rather than the other way around as in the case of 
the ordinary concession contract. Unlike typical agricultural subsidies, therefore, PES can be 
considered a form of joint venture between the private and the public sector, where both parties, 
by way of a contract voluntarily subscribed by both, agree to pursue some common goals by 
sharing parts of the costs and the benefits. It is important to recognize, however, that the 
objectives of the PES explicitly recognized in the contract only partly reflects the real goals of the 
contracting parties.  PES long run scope both for the government and the farmers, in fact should 
have the broader goal of building up farmers’ capacity and skills to provide a range of agro-
ecological services, in the form of developing conservation skills and more balanced forms of 
agricultural and environmental activities. PES should thus be considered an investment in 
capabilities, whose benefits and costs should be assessed in terms of their expected changes of 
the agricultural system in the direction of sustainable economic activities and environmental 
services.  
Because of its long run objective, the PES system should be considered a departure from the 
traditional way of pursuing agricultural development, which tended to be narrowly focused on 
objectives of production or income increases. In addition to its productive and income effects, in 
fact, PES impact on agriculture should consists mainly in the creation of new opportunities for 
farmers and rural communities. These opportunities, which expand the set of production and 
management choices, can be evaluated as real options, a concept increasingly used in cost 
benefit analysis to assess projects under uncertainty. 
 
7. Designing PES schemes for the target region 
 
The Target Region  
 
The target region for the study includes forest and mountain grasslands of Shamakhi and Ismailli 
Districts of Azerbaijan. High mountain areas (>2700 m) are characterized by upland cold desert 
climate, while in lower territories (1500-2700 m) cold winter climate with abundant rainfall is 
dominant. The hydrological network is  characterized by mountain streams with  high spring  flow. 
Due to intense water withdrawals, some of these streams may go dry between July-September. 
The rivers are characterized by flash floods, debris and mudflows, with  Girdman, Vandam, Aksu 
and Pirsaat  being the major basins of small streams. Water resources of these streams are widely 
used in drinking water supply and irrigation. Several water reservoirs are built to collect and 
reserve water. Sustainability of grasslands and forests is essential to regulate these streams. 
The area is characterized by extensive farming which mainly include cattle breeding. Overgrazing 
and illegal logging are the main issues that concern current land use activities. Recent activities 
make the area very vulnerable in terms of land degradation and erosion that in turn reduce 
quality of ecosystems and ecosystem services provided by grassland and forests.  Most of the 
activities happen over the summer months. Pasturing, honey production, and tourist activities 
reach their peak during the summer months.   This makes stakeholders’ problems more severe. 
For example, honey gathering and pasturing fall in almost the same season.  
 
Ecosystem Services provided by forests and grasslands in  the target region 
 
Forests and grasslands provide a broad range of ecosystem services and goods. Forests reduce 
summer and increase winter temperatures, purify water, regulate streams’ flows, and reduce 
disaster (flood and drought) risks (Douglas, 2001; Costanza et al., 2007).  Grasslands provide a 
broad range of regulating, supporting and cultural services as well. They are an important source 
of food resources, milk and honey.  Mountain grasslands are also providers of clean water to 
downstream communities. They provide habitat and conservation of wildlife, maintain soil 
fertility and regulate water.  Forests also purify water through soil stabilization and removing 
contaminants. These types of ecosystem services may significantly reduce water treatment costs. 
For example, a study by R.S. de Groot et al reports that the preservation of natural watersheds 
in New York, avoided the construction of a $6 billion water treatment plant, so this implies that 
the watershed is worth $6 billion (Groot et.al. 2002). Forests filter sediments from water, thereby 
considerably reducing power generation costs by increasing effectiveness of work of the 
hydropower dams. It is believed that correct watershed management can avoid expenses related 
to the water treatment. Sediment filtering also contributes to improving of fish habitats 
(Costanza at.al 1997). 
Forests and grasslands also provide a reliable shelter for many types of living organisms and 
essential for biodiversity protection. Recreation, soil protection and cultural peculiarities of 
forests are the most important ecosystem services that forests provide (Costanza et al., 1997; 
Pearce and Atkinson, 1993). Timber and all types of non-timber products have always been 
important sources of securing the necessities of life (Abbasov, 2014). Grasslands provide food, 
clean air, water and many types of non-use values.  
Forests cover about one third of the terrestrial world. According to national statistics, in 
Azerbaijan, they cover more than 11% of the total area, and exist mainly in mountain regions of 
the country (Abbasov 2014). There is no exact information regarding the areas of grasslands in 
the country. In the project area forests provide wooden construction materials, fuel, food, 
mushrooms and animals for local people. Over the long periods, forests were only heating 
sources for local communities. Many medicines, biocides, honey, spices are derived from forests. 
Grasslands provide honey, medicinal plants, meat, and milk.  Recently, in most of the rural areas 
of Azerbaijan fuel wood is a major source of energy. Wood is used to bake bread, prepare meals 
and heat houses during the winter. According to a recent study (Abbasov 2014), nearly 2 million 
of people in Azerbaijan consume non-treated clean water, which comes mainly from forested 
areas. During the Soviet period, most of the villages in Azerbaijan used to use coal from Ukraine, 
the price of which was relatively cheap. Several studies confirm that average household wood 
use is nearly 12-15 m3 (Noack and Hidayatov, 2006).  
Cattle breeding is a central activity for all rural regions of Azerbaijan.  Livestock and dairy products 
are the main products of rural regions in Azerbaijan. An official statistics confirm that more than 
50 percent of the local incomes contributed by livestock rearing. During the summer periods, 
grasslands and forested areas are used as the primary grazing areas. Table 7 describes forms of 
these services provided by forests and grasslands in Azerbaijan.  
Forest and grassland vegetation increase soil porosity, as a result of which large amount of water 
can be deposited in the ground. This in turn notably increases infiltrations and positively change 
downstream groundwater discharges. This enables to provide water for all long lasting dry 
periods.  Both forests and grasslands may be considered as provisional and regulatory services  
for water storage enabling. On one hand,  for storing water in the ground, these ecosystems 
buffer floods and droughts, while, on the other hand water storing increase groundwater 
discharges during dry seasons creating additional economic value. 
Table 7: Ecosystem Services provided by forests and grasslands in Ismailli and Shamakhi 
 
 In addition, regulatory services of forests enable to protect small mountain streams in Azerbaijan 
from going dry in summer periods. Small mountain streams are the preferred spawning grounds 
for Caspian Sturgeons that have extremely high value. The Caspian Sea contains over 90% of the 
world’s sturgeon population (Williot et al., 2002). The most valuable representatives of Caspian 
sturgeons are beluga (Huso-Huso), Iranian sturgeon (A. persicus) and Russian sturgeon (A. 
gueldenstaedti). These species migrate to rivers small mountain rivers and  streams in the areas 
close to outlets (Abbasov and Smakhtin, 2009). Another valuable fish is the  Caspian salmon that 
migrates to the  sources of the mountain streams, located in the  mountain regions. The Caspian 
Salmon  is included in the  Red Books of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. In Azerbaijan and 
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Almost in all forested regions of Azerbaijan, forests provide clean and filtered water for the local 
population, so that  there is no need to build water treatment plants. In other words, the 
mountain forests of Azerbaijan provide a sufficient low-cost water supply for the local 
populations. Estimatesby Abbasov R. (2014) confirm that more than 2 million of people in 
Azerbaijan use naturally purified water from forests.  
Because mass logging reduces filtering ability of ecosystems and reduces infiltration rates 
(Abbasov and Mahmudov, 2010),  as a result of the intense deforestation  in the 1990s, sediment 
flow in the Kura river increased notably. This resulted in increasing water treatment costs in the 
downstream regions.  Several studies confirm that logging processes are directly associated with 
increased frequency of erosions (  ).  
Forests in Azerbaijan are also the main natural regulators of  temperature. They considerably 
reduce summer temperatures and increase winter temperatures.  Reduced difference between 
summer and winter temperatures makes areas more attractive with respect to agricultural and 
tourist activities.  In addition, this circumstance reduces heating expenses in winter and cooling 
expenses in summer.  For example, the Gobustan district, which is very close to Shamakhi, has 
no forests and as a consequence, its yearly temperature amplitudes are much higher and so are, 
cooling and heating expenses.  
Forests  have also a big function in carbon sequestration. According to Second National 
Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2010) volume 
of carbon removal by woodlands in 2005 was more than 3,800 Gt. This amount makes 7% of the 
country’s total CO2 emissions (SNC, 2010). 
Finally, forests and grasslands of Azerbaijan have high value with regard to cultural services. 
Generally, both ecosystems have very important functions that support tourism and recreation. 
Grasslands and forests are the preferred touristic attractions for local and international tourists.  
Hiking, hunting, gathering and other touristic activities can be considered as the high economic 
values. Several studies confirm that number of tourists visiting the area closely depend on 
mountain landscapes that include forests and grasslands (Abbasov 2014) .  
Over the past 20 years,  the population of Azerbaijan has increasingly given importance to the 
existence values of valuable species. These services are seen as the supporting services of local 
ecosystems. There are many types of valuable species that live in forests and grasslands. Shahdag 
national Park that is located in the target region is home to East Caucasian tur (Capra 
cylindricornis), Caucasian chamois (Rupicapra rupicapra subsp. caucasica), Bezoar ibex (Capra 
aegagrus aegagrus), domestic goat (Capra aegagrus hircus), lynx (Lynx lynx), brown bear (Ursus 
arctos), wild boar (Susscrofa) etc. These species are highly valuable in terms of existence value, 
which can be valu ed as the willingness to pay of the society for protection of natural assets.  
Because  forests and grasslands naturally reduce risks of erosion and  flow of debris, in areas 
where slopes are very steep, levels of  erosion and risks  of landslides are high and make the areas 




8. A PES Design and Scope for the Project Area 
 
Identification of potential economic benefits 
 
Benefits from the PES schemes are expected from both use and nonuse value creation. 
Table 8 .  Potential Economic Benefits from PES Strategies  
 
Outcomes Economic Benefits 
Reduction of 
overgrazing 




Avoided costs of hazard protection 
Avoided costs of water treatment 
Avoided damages to infrastructure (roads, private and public 
property, etc) 
Increase in property values 
Increase in non-timber forest products 
Increase in esthetic values 
Increase in non-use values  
Reduction of risk of diseases 
Improved recreational fishing  
Improved recreational activities 
Improved ecosystems 
Protection of valuable species 
 Potential Sellers 
 
Several potential sellers can be identified for pasture and forest use in the area. These sellers 
include various types of needs and requirements and can be divided into internal and external 
sellers.    
Sellers mainly consist of local population, landowners, land renters and municipalities. The social 
structure for local population of the target region is very simple. Most of the people are involved 
in agricultural activities and have a pastoral or semi-pastoral type of life.  Despite the fact that 
the living conditions in the village are not high, they are mostly the same across the population 
and most people do not consider themselves poor.  
Creation of an economic background should be the main goal of this project (integrated erosion 
management program) through which erosion could be controlled as well. This economic 
background should be protected by solid and sustainable income sources.  
As we have noted, the main income source of the local communities is cattle breeding, which in 
turn causes intense loss of fertile soils, erosion, and creates  high risks of  future disasters. 
Therefore, supporting all types of economic activities that will in turn produce diverse income 
sources for the community is the only way to support local ecosystems as well. These economic 
activities should be environmentally friendly and maintain sustainable development in the target 
region. Therefore, capacity building for “environmentally friendly economic activities” should be 
an important part of the project.  
 
Several  potential participants (sellers) of PES schemes  can be identified in the area, with various 
types of needs and requirements (figure 1). These stakeholders are identified based only on their 
income sources. 
 
1. Cattle breeders. Cattle-breeding is the most traditional, important work and the only 
income source of the local communities.  Almost all the cattle breeders  adopt a semi 
nomadic style. In October, they move their cattle to winter pastures  located in the  
central and non-mountainous part of Azerbaijan. The cattle is then moved back to 
summer pastures in May- early June. Since cattle-breeding is the only source of income, 
these people are highly interested in dense grasslands. However, these pastures are 
subject to the tragedy of common and nobody cares about conservation, protection and 
overusage. All types of payments for ecosystem services should thus be concentrated on 
cattle breeders, in order  toreduce the number of cattle and change the traditional semi-
nomadic practices. 
2. Beekeeping. Beekeepers are the second largest group in the area and honey harvesting 
is the second most important resource of local communities. Bees are kept in wooden 
beehives during winter time and,  starting from May, they are released to the area to 
collect honey.  Beekeepers are highly interested in having permanent flower and bush 
cover in pastures and forests,  since high quality plant cover is required to produce high 
quality honey. They are also interested in introducing new flowery plant species that 
could serve as a source of honey. Local forests and grasslands thus offer high quality 
beekeeping services. 
3.  Fruits and vegetable producers.  Intensive cultivation of fruits and vegetables was one 
of the main activities in the past. While the villagers  can produce high quality apples, over 
the past 20 years market problems  caused the loss of much of apple growing economic 
appeal. Although the trees still exist in some villages, apples are not collected and do not 
serve as an income source of local people. However, apple tree  owners are still interested 
in selling their products and would be also interested in processing of fruit products.  
4. Wild fruit and berry gathering. Wild fruit gathering has a large potential for future 
employment. Hippophae, barberry, hips, wild medlar, wild pear, and wild apple are the 
most important berries and fruits that can be gathered. Most of these products are 
occasionally used in herbal medicine (e.g. thyme). People make various types of natural 
jams, molasses and various types of syrups. These natural products are highly valued in 
the local market and tourists that visit the area are often interested in obtaining them. In 
order to produce high quality wild fruit products, local tree and bush cover should be 
protected well. Groups of people that gather fruits are interested in protecting these trees 
and bushes. Of late, a rather large group of people have been involved in gathering wild 
fruits. Like apple growers, this group of people is also interested in processing fruit 
products.  
5. Pasture lessees. Pasture lessees are people who lease summer pastures for use. These 
people are not local residents. Every year, a considerable part of the land is leased by local  
to them by municiplaities . According to legal regulations, not more than 8 sheep (or 
goats) per ha are allowed to pasture.  
6. Local Municipalities. Local municipalities are the big landowners in the region. They own 
vast summer pastures that are almost completely  rented out to pasture lessees.  
However, neither the municipality nor community members have a sufficient  
opportunity to control leasers’ activity . Because they are not owners, pasture lessees use 
these pastures as much as possible and are not interested in protection.  This causes great 
danger to the sustainable use of pastures in the future. Although leasing brings high 
income to the municipality, some community members suggest that this activity 
threatens future existence of pastures.  
7. Tourism workers. Although tourists are still a relatively small group, the attractive 
landscape and the biodiverse and pristine characteristics of much of the environment 
hold a great potential for various forms of eco-tourism. Development of recreational 
activities may also create a large group of people that will be interested in using land in a 
sustainable manner. On the side of the local population,  young people are very interested 
in the development of tourism in the village, since this may create attractive employment 
opportunities. Construction of small size hotels, hostel-houses, hiking routes, and services 
may help to develop tourism in the area. Tourism may also aid the development of wild 




Potential buyers are the parties which could pay for ecosystem services. These are people, 
companies, government or foundations that are interested in improving  the supply of  
ecosystem services or protection of the environment in the region.  In other words, every 
side that is ready to support (to pay) local landowners or communities with the purpose of 
nature protection can be classified as potential buyer.  These buyers may have various needs 
and concerns in terms of ecosystem services’ quality and nature protection. 
1. Government of Azerbaijan. The Government of Azerbaijan (GoA) is highly interested in 
improving quality of ecosystem services as well as protection of valuable ecosystems in 
mountain areas. State policy of Azerbaijan on protection of ecosystems is well reflected in 
various laws and programs. For example, the National Program on Environmentally 
Sustainable Social-Economic Development specifies that future development of resources of  
the Azerbaijani Republic should be environmentally sustainable and that all natural 
resources, including forests and grasslands, should be carefully managed and protected. This 
program covered the period of 2003-2010 and under this program extensive activities have 
been carried out. The National Forestry Program of Azerbaijan covers the period of 2015-
2030 and under this program extensive protection and forestation measures have been 
implemented . GoA  is interested in protecting both use and non-use values of ecosystems.  
Its  support to landowners may come in the form of subsidies or direct contract to farmers. 
In many countries governments run programs directed to protection of ecosystems through 
farmer support. GoA may also run similar programs in short and long term periods. It is 
important to point out, however, that,while GoA has some experience with subsidies that 
worked efficiently over the last 15 years, PES schemes would require a complete change in 
both the targets and the ways of implementing agricultural policies.  
 The following government organizations may represent government in activities related to 
PES: 
a. Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources. The Ministry of Ecology and Natural 
Resources (MENR) is the central body of executive power that realizes the state 
policy on the protection of environment, organizing of the use of nature, efficient 
use and restoration of natural resources. MENR is also in charge of protection of 
forest resources, their efficient use, restoration of fallen forests, and 
establishment of new forest strips. It can thus manage  PES schemes that directly 
support environmental protection (e.g.  for PES  cap and trade sytems  for 
pollution and water abstractions, maximum allowable use permits and trading can 
be managed by MENR).  MENR  can count on  well  developed local structures 
withlocal offices in every administrative district.  
b. Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
(MOA) is a body of executive power that forms and implements state policy in the 
field of agriculture. MOA provides practical assistance to local executive structures 
in conducting agrarian reforms.  It has exclusive authority  in organizing  breeding, 
quarantine and sanitary measures. It also manages government subsidies that 
support various types of agricultural activities.  MOA can thus manage  all types of 
PES schemes that support fiscal mechanisms driven by government (e.g. Subsidies 
to land owners). These  may include activities related to implementation of new 
agricultural practices, changing  agricultural activities or supporting 
environmentally friendly agricultural works. The  MOA managed PES schemes 
could include erosion management, quotas for cattle  and support for beekeeping 
and pilot farms  
2. Azersu Join Stock Company. This company is the  main drinking water supplier in 
Azerbaijan.  Azersu manages  large water sources in the downstream part of the 
Girdmanchay river.  One example of the amount of eater available from these sources is  
the Kululu water source, is located in downstream areas of Girdmanchay,   with roughly 
0.5 m3/c of high quality water that can approximately supply   50000 people with 24/7 
service. By developing  higher service standards, Azersu could increase water tariffs and 
part of these resources could go to PES. 
3. Amelioration and Water Economy Open Joint Stock Company (AWE). This is a state 
owned company that is responsible for provision of water supply to the agricultural 
bodies and amelioration of lands. All existing irrigation schemes, distribution channels, 
collector-drainage networks in the country are in the balance of this institution. The 
institution also deals with irrigation schemes that are under construction now. In most 
regions, the departments responsible for irrigation channels and collector-drainage 
networks operate separately. Recently, AWE has established extensive water withdrawal 
points in the basins of Girdmanchay, Pirsaatchay and Goychay.  The water withdrawn 
comes from upstream areas and is regulated by forests and grasslands.  Therefore, AWE 
can implement PES schemes that directly support farmers and upstream population.   
AWE also has Winter Pastures Water Supply Systems Operation Offices that manage the 
water supply of winter pastures. Therefore, it would be possible to develop a PES scheme 
(for example, in the form of free water for winter pasture), that would  increase 
effectiveness of winter pastures and reduce pressure on summer pastures. 
4. Visitors. Tourists (about 20000) come into the area mainly during summer. New hiking 
routes and development of infrastructure may increase touristic activities in the future. 
Visitors are interested to pay for nice landscape, clean water, clean air and calm suburban 
environment. These payments may flow through local touristic enterprises including 
hotels, resorts, restaurants, etc.  
5. Potential visitors. Potential visitors include all the people who live in big cities of 
Azerbaijan and would visit the area. Potential visitors are the people who would willing 
to pay for option and existence values or simply interested in protection of ecosystems, 
animals, forests, grasslands etc. 
6. Foundations and other non profit institutions (FNPI). In most of countries, where PES 
schemes are applied successfully, FNPI   are present as service buyers. In other words, 
foundations give support to landowners to apply environmentally friendly practices that 
enable increased quality of services. For example, in United Stated of America, trust funds 
use voluntary tools such as conservation agreements, land purchases, land donations, 
cooperative acquisitions, and a landowner registry program to conserve lands for 
ecological, scenic, and open space values. Presently, there are no FNPIs in Azerbaijan that 
could support PES schemes. However, several foundations that currently work on issues 
related to sustainable development might make some pilot projects. Another option is to 
establish land conservation funds that could work in PES.  
8. UN agencies. The main UN agency that would be interested on pilot PES project is UNDP. 
Currently, within its various types of environment related projects and studies UNDP tries 
to find ways to develop PES practice in Azerbaijan. In the future, UNDP could support one 










PES systems require a careful assessment of the values embedded in the different ecosystems. 
These values should take into account the different ecosystem services and should be based both 
on subjective and objective evaluation criteria. The best method to assign values in PES  can be 
obtained through the so called reverse auctions, whereby stakeholders such as farmers, 
pastoralists,  and villagers  are asked to submit an offer based on their willingness to accept 
payments for specific eco-services. However, both to plan the PES characteristics and to define 
the value basis for the auction, two different types of prior evaluation should be implemented. 
These are, respectively, a preliminary valuation based on data from other sites, and a survey of 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept attitudes on the part of selected stakeholders.  
 
The more reliable methodology for the preliminary valuation is a meta-analysis of ecosystem 
studies.  Meta-analysis (MA) itself is a methodology for investigating the research of different 
studies on the same topic and synthesize the results with a common effect using regression 
techniques (Stanley, 2001; Brander 2012). MA was first proposed by Glass (1976) as a method to 
construct a  systematic quantitative summary of evidence across empirical studies. It has been 
defined as having three general purposes (Bergstrom and Taylor 2006, Rosemberg and Loomis 
2000): (i) combining results on a particular topic, (ii) regress and test hypotheses between 
predicted and explanatory variables and, (iii) use the results as a transfer function, allowing 
adjustments of different benefits provided by the ecosystem. In the field of environmental 
economics, in particular, MA represents the practice of using a collection of formal and informal 
statistical methods to synthesize the results found in a well-defined class of empirical studies 
(Smith and Pattanayak 2002). 
 
In the 1990s, for the field of environmental valuation, meta-analysis has started to play an 
important role in environmental economic research. Several studies have focused on 
environmental issues, on the basis of single or multiple valuation techniques. The reason of the 
importance given to this analytical instrument can be linked to the increase in the available 
number of heterogeneous environmental valuation studies; the seemingly large differences in 
valuation outcomes as a result of the use of different research designs and, in view of the high 
costs of carrying out environmental valuation studies and the increasing demand for transferable 
valuation results (Woodward and Wui 2001). 
 
 
Meta-analysis of ecosystems 
 
In order to develop a preliminary valuation of the Azerbajan ecosystem interested by the project, 
and investigate how different variables influence the values of different ecosystem services, we  
used  the estimates from a recent study by Scandizzo and Cufari (2015), a meta-analysis based 
on 110 studies randomly selected for three different kinds of ecosystems: grasslands, wetlands 
and forests. Grasslands comprise mainly savannahs and rangelands. The wetland category refers 
to every kind of wetland ecosystem, including mangroves areas and predominant in Asian 
countries, and Forests reflect either specific studies made on forests, or the value  estimates for 
forests included in studies on a main ecosystem/biome. The total number of studies selected is 
110,  but almost every study evaluates several ecosystem services with different valuation 
methods, so that the number of observations may be more than 110 when different ecosystem 
services values and valuation methods are used as covariates. Also, in several studies, more than 
one ecosystem has been evaluated, because an area can include two or more different types of 
ecosystems. These practices reflect the fact that different methodologies of evaluation are used 
for different services, according to the distinction between direct and indirect use and non-use 
value (Costanza 2006, Barbier 2006, Faber et al 2006). 
 
In the meta-analysis, our main variable of interest, as a dependent covariate, is the economic 
value of the observed ecosystem, while the explanatory variables, following other meta-
regression studies (Brander et al 2005, Woodward and Wui, 2001, Brower et al 1999), are 
grouped into categories corresponding to: (i) the evaluation method, that is the methodology 
applied to assign an economic value to the ecosystem; (ii) the ecosystem services, according to 
the services  provided to the area/community and evaluated into the study, (iii) the geographic 
area, i.e. the area where the study was made and, (iv) other explanatory variables, such as GDP 
per capita, the size of the area considered into the study and the population density. Two sets of 
data are used to capture the impact of climate change in the area object of study: the monthly 
average temperature changes (measured in °C) in the area of study from 1990 to 2009, taken 
from World Bank Climate Database, and the Monthly average rainfall (measured in mm) for the 
study area for the same range of time, taken from the same source. These data have been 
transformed in annual means and variances for the corresponding variables of temperature and 
rainfall changes. The studies selected cover a period of publication of 32 years, from 1980 to 
2012. The year variable included into the dataset was converted into a yearly index, by taking the 
difference between the publication year and 1980. Economic values are estimated in US$ per 
hectares per year. All values, including GDPs, have been converted in constant 2005 prices taking 
into account the yearly inflation rate for every country. 
 
TABLE 9: Descriptive statistics by ecosystem type (2005 US$/ha) 
  FOREST WETLAND GRASSLAND TOTAL 
          
 Mean 817.0237 1272.48 698.1188 940.0937 
 Median 126.6623 463.9378 45.38186 181.1486 
 Maximum 6858.386 10209.92 6559.159 10209.92 
 Minimum 2.044972 8.479397 1.357268 1.357268 
 Std. Dev. 1804.051 1852.803 1615.74 1743.898 
 Observations 44 55 27 110 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
TABLE 10: Descriptive statistics by geographic area (2005 US$ per ha) 
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s 9 14 12 7 32 27 10 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
 
TABLE 11: Descriptive statistics by evaluation method (2005 US$/ha) 
  CV MP TC HP PF NFI RC OPPC BT 
                    
 Mean 1082.26 1042.40 509.94 718.53 584.20 1221.66 676.72 72.11 1671.59 
 Median 116.76 234.86 232.99 138.66 463.94 226.56 439.42 56.04 847.24 
 Maximum 10209.92 6802.13 1868.36 4948.87 1396.25 6802.13 1868.36 229.04 6212.10 
 Minimum 1.36 6.68 8.48 27.05 27.26 14.13 27.05 7.66 72.74 
 Std. Dev. 2308.51 1676.57 639.35 1710.72 536.63 1823.66 663.55 73.75 2349.37 
 Observations 39 52 9 8 9 24 9 8 6 
 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 






































































































































49 33 49 19 36 5 5 13 29 105 39 
Source: Authors’ computation 
 
 
Considering all the studies (Tables 9-12), the average economic value is around 940 US dollars 
per hectare, with the maximum and the minimum value found respectively for a US and a 
Mexican mangrove site. The median value, however, is much lower than the average and shifted 
toward the minimum, at about 160 US dollars per ha. Contingent valuation studies are widely 
represented among the studies, together with the market price method to evaluate the services. 
These correspond to the predominance of ecosystem services evaluated in tourism and 
recreational, forestry and biodiversity. Many studies, in fact, calculate the willingness to pay for 
tourism and recreational activities, aiming, at the same time, at assigning values to biodiversity 
conservation. Another frequent practice, especially for forest evaluation, is to evaluate forestry 
resources with the market price value methodology (Shackleton et al 2002, Godoy et al 1993, 
Campbell et al 1997). 
 
Table 13: OLS Regression (White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance) 
Dependent variable: log(value) 
 
   
   Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
   
   C 4.415613 1.100942 
YEAR -0.008185 -0.332181 
GRASSLAND 0.886925 1.559620 
WETLAND 1.049406 1.995955** 
FOREST 0.882169 2.229226** 
LOG(SIZE) 0.022074 0.383232 





TC -0.348560 -0.681721 
RC -0.033143 -0.078607 
PF 0.900575 1.661665 





NFI 0.743899 1.727142* 
BT -0.386497 -0.654778 
FORESTRY 0.376534 0.944249 
FISHERY 0.912306 2.433650** 




CARBON 1.225927 2.345614** 
FODDER 0.192937 0.250530 
OV 0.338849 0.435172 
LOG(GDP_05) 0.202765 0.842129 
LOG(POPDENS) 0.002356 0.013133 



















OCE -2.643170 -1.724923* 
LOG(AVTEM) 0.133863 0.457265 
LOG(VARTEM) -0.185449 -1.320066 
LOG(AVRAIN) 0.688088 1.341825 
LOG(VARRAIN) -0.285619 -1.285453 
NONUSE 0.084372 0.196343 
   
   R-squared 0.566507 
Adjusted R-squared 0.349760 
S.E. of regression 1.657046 
   
   Source: Scandizzo and Cufari (2015) 
Statistical significance: *>10%, **>5%, ***>1% 
 
 
The coefficients of the scalar covariates measure the percentage change (elasticity) in the 
dependent variable, for a one percentage change in the value of the independent variables, while 
the coefficients of the dummy variables indicate how much the value of the category indicated 
confers a premium or a penalty with respect to the constant of the regression. In this respect 
wetland ecosystems appear to command a robust value premium, while the African ecosystems 
tend to have consistent lower values than similar ecosystems in other countries. Water 
ecosystem services, as well as carbon sequestration and fishery production,  also appear to 
confer a positive and significant value premium to the ecosystems. Value is also positively related 
to population density. The same result holds for the GDP variable. 
 
Preliminary Value Assessment of the Project Area 
 
In order to develop a preliminary valuation of the ecotypes of the project area, we consider its 
classification according to the two criteria of the ecological regions and IPCC climate type (Table 
11). Using The equation  from the meta-analysis in Table 13, and the  relevant statistics for the 
variables included, we obtain the estimates in Table 15. These estimates suggest a varying 
pattern of ecosystem values across the ecological zone, with the lowest values for the temperate 
desert area. The total values, however, are considerable and amount to a grand total of 147 
million US$. These values, however, are subject to considerable local variations, especially as the 
consequence of the combined change of temperature and rainfall (Table 16). These can be seen 
as across space as well as climate change induced variations. 
 
Table 14. Ecological regions (ha) and IPCC climate types (ha) for Ismayilli and Shamakhi rayons. 
 

















Ismayilli  158,834  17,033  31,391  121,051  67,213  20,141  
Shamakhi  100,755  25,822  8,203  79,340  52,892  3,306  
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                           Values per Ha  (US$)                    Total Values (US$) 
Rayon        
Ismayilli  429.5 354.4 427.8 68,214,738 7,276,816 13,430,152 88,921,706 
Shamakhi  429.0 318.8 426.5 43,225,062 11,042,460 3,498,447 57,765,969 




 Table  16.  Value per ha as a function of  temperature and rainfall variation  
 
 
  Coeff. of Variation of Rainfall  
Average Temperature 0.9 1.0 1.3 1.5 
 
                                       US  $ per Ha 
 
5 519 494 431 409 
10 426 401 345 318 
15 302 302 250 250 
 








10. Next Step: A Contingent Valuation Study 
 
While the meta-analysis yields a preliminary valuation of the ecotypes in the project area, a useful 
second step to complete such an assessment is constituted by a contingent valuation (CV) study. 
This will consist in analyzing the “stated preferences” of  eligible stakeholders (mainly tourists 
and local population) for the consumption of ecological services and for the conservation of 
cultural and natural heritage. It is proposed to apply a first CV study to a small test sample in this 
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phase. A PES program will then be recommended on the basis, inter alia, of the information 
provided by the test case and  a representative sample will be used prior to the launch of the PES 
program. The analysis will be developed by applying questionnaires designed to gather relevant 
information for policies to finance preservation and endogenous economic development, with  
focus on measures of specific components of the total economic value for ecosystem services, 
especially the contribution for non-use value. The main objective of the survey and the 
subsequent analysis will be to ascertain the interviewees’ opinions and sensitivity with respect 
to the main environmental problems. This will provide qualitative as well as quantitative 
indications for policies and financing sources on cultural and economic issues in the context of  
planning and managing a PES system, as it will allow a complete and reliable measure of total 
economic value of ecosystem services.  
Willingness to pay, as well as willingness to accept measures are elicited in the context of the 
Contingent Valuation Methodology (CVM), a procedure widely used in the context of valuation 
of goods with no market prices, such as many environmental goods. In this context the value 
assigned refers to non-use value or nonmarket use value or both (Venkatachalam 2004).  
A typical CVM survey in environmental studies starts with the familiarization of the interviewee 
with a project proposal on the environmental good or resource. The project proposal aims to 
identify an improvement of the environment and a method to finance it. On this basis, the 
interviewee is requested to answer questions about the willingness to pay (WTP) or, in the case 
of PES possible sellers, the willingness to accept (WTA) payments for the improvement.  
The WTP/A questions can be structured in several ways and may be organized according to  open-
ended patterns, bidding games, payment cards and dichotomous choices. The open-ended 
pattern consists in simple questions on the maximum willingness to pay of  the interviewee for 
the project to be valued. This method is not used often, because of the difficulty for the 
interviewees to answer the question, resulting in many missing WTP/A values. In the bidding 
game approach, instead, interviewees are asked if they are willing to pay (or to accept) a certain 
amount and then, if the answer is yes (or not) to increase (decrease) the amount until the answer 
is negative (positive), with the last answer interpreted as WTP/A. The criticism to this approach 
is that there might be a starting point and a final WTP/A bias, and a non-reliable answer from 
interviewees who are impatient to finish the interview.  The payment card method consists in 
listing possible values of WTP/A on a card and showing them to the interviewee, who should 
choose the payments that correspond to her willingness to pay. The dichotomous choice method 
(or referendum format), consists in a question about voting yes or not for a public program on 
environmental good. 
 




Table 17 . Pros and Cons of Different Methods of WTP /A Elicitation 
 
OPEN ENDED PAYMENT 
CARD 
BIDDING GAME REFERENDUM 









Bidding process is 
likely to capture 
maximum WTP 
and /or minimum 
WTA; 
Realistic – individuals 
typically make 
decisions faced with 
fixed price; but not 
useful for WTA 
Avoids ‘anchoring’ 




  Simple nature of 
choice (yes or no); 
Less incentive to lie 
Straightforwar
d calculation of 
willingness to pay 






strategic bias, more 







used on the 
card; 
Starting bid is in 
likely range of 
expected payment 
– responds quickly 
to please 
interviewer; 
Framing or Anchoring 
effect arising from the 
probability of 
accepting the bid level 
due to ignorance 
about true valuation; 





Starting bid far 
away – 
respondent gets 
tired of bidding 
Danger that the 
respondents 
exposure to the first 
offer would influence 
WTP due to lack of 
knowledge of costs  




them to accept the 
follow-up offer; 
      May need to make 
assumptions on 
statistical distribution 
of WTP to estimate 
the WTP function 
 
 
While WTA studies may be used to elicit anticipated values on the part of possible providers, 
most empirical measurements suggest that WTAs may considerably overstate the value placed 
on the asset by the stakeholders. As a consequence, WTPs are considered more reliable as a basis 
for the estimation of values of natural assets, even in the case where the questions are asked out 
of possible providers of the ecological services valued.  In general, however, the following 
methodological considerations based on the literature, apply both to WTP and WTA. 
Bishop and Heberlein first introduced the single bounded dichotomous choice approach in 1979, 
to answer to the typical problems raised by open-ended questions.  This approach  is based on a  
a range of predetermined bids from which  a single bid is assigned  to each interviewee as the 
maximum WTP amount for the particular good. The answer of the interviewee, who is asked 
whether she accepts the value assigned, can  be yes or no, as in a take it or leave it approach 
(Bishop and Herberlein, 1979; Mitchel and Carson, 1989; Haneman, 1994).The major advantage 
of this procedure is that it facilitates the completion of the valuation approach from the 
respondents, minimizing the risk of strategic bias in the WTP answer (Hanemann 1994; Carson et 
al., 1996).  Disadvantages however arise from the fact that one can derive from this method only 
the maximum and not the actual willingness to pay; furthermore there is the possibility of starting 
point bias (Alberini, 1995; Boyle et al., 1996; Ready et al., 1996; Carson et al., 1996).  
Hanemann (1984, 1985), has introduced a modified version of the single bounded approach, 
called the double bounded approach, simply adding a follow-up question to the first question 
with the first bid. A one more bid to the first question is added as a second question and the 
amount of the second bid depends on the answer to the first question, with the second bid higher 
or lower than the first bid depending on whether the answer to the fist question is yes or no.  
This methodology was first applied by Carson and Steinberg (1990) followed by Hanemann et al. 
(1991) and has been proven as statistically more efficient than the single bounded approach 
(Hanneman 1991; Kanninen, 1993; Alberini, 1995). In particular, Hanemann et al. (1991), have 
derived asymptotical gain in efficiency with the  double-bounded model, by describing the 
Maximum likelihood estimation of this model and comparing it with the maximum likelihood 
estimation of the single-bounded methodThis approach also poses some problems, however, 
such as starting point bias and yea-saying problems (Ready et al., 1996).  
Several studies (Carson et al., 1996), suggest that in general the dichotomous choice technique 
provides higher values for the WTP elicited than open-ended questions. The basic reason is that 
the dichotomous choice method minimizes the occurrence of strategic bias, the yea-saying effect 
and in general the tendency of respondents to provide a lower value of WTP when facing a 
difficult open-ended question (Brown et al., 1996). This has determined a shift in recent years in 
contingent valuation studies from openended elicitation to dichotomous choice formats, also 
because this technique has been recommended by the NOOA panel in the contingent valuation 
guidelines (NOOA, 1993). However, the econometric analysis required by this technique is more 
complicated than the open-ended analysis and modeling. (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999).  
In the context of PES planning, a number of studies  evaluate the willingness to pay for its 
development and all the environmental goods involved , which have non-market values and need 
to be evaluated through contingent valuation scheme.  
This methodology, for example,was used by Loewen and Kulshreshta (1995), together with the 
travel cost method to evaluate the recreation value of  Prince Alberta National Park. They found 
that interviewees spent an average of 30$ to visit the park, with the travel cost method showing 
a consumer surplus of 24$, contingent valuation a surplus of around 13$ per person per day with 
a final estimate of   total recreation value of the park of around 16 million $ per year. 
A dichotomous choice framework was used to evaluate the willingness to pay for the Changdeok 
Place (Kim et al., 2004), employing both linear and logarithm logit model. The bid was fixed at 10, 
as a result of a pre-test and the final WTP value was estimated around 6$ per person, with the 
final aggregate value of around 2 million dollars.  
Revenues for coral reef conservation were proposed by the study made in the Philippines (Arin 
and Kramer, 2002), which evaluated, through contingent valuation, the WTP for a marine 
sanctuary as source of finance for marine reserves and rentability for local   resources. The 
average WTP was estimated at around 5$, with a total value of around 1 million dollars for the 
island.   
In South Africa, Dumadisile et al, (2005), made a study on a natural reserve areas for the 
recreation activity and showed that the WTP of the visitors where between 8$ and 16$. The study 
was assessed with the referendum format framework and a total of 120 questionnaires were 
made. 
A study of the restoration of ecosystem services was made in China by Zonghmin et al. (2005). 
With the Payment card format, the WTP estimated was around 2.5$ per person and a present 
value of 8 million dollars for the total value.  Biodiversity conservation was estimated by Baral et 
al. (2008) for Annapurna park in Nepal, where they applied contingent valuation with the scheme 
of referendum format to the visitors and found a average willingness to pay from a logit 
regression of around 69$ (more than the actual 27$ of the park ticket).  Scott and Hosein (2013), 
applied a study of contingent valuation for the conservation of biodiversity in Grand Riviere, 
employing the scheme of double-bounded dichotomous choice and finding a WTP of 1.35$.  
One of the most important criticisms of contingent valuation studies comes from Housman 
(2012), who states that there are basically three kinds of problems with the application of those 
studies. The first is a bias in the sense of overstatement of values for willingness to pay; the 
second is a large difference between willingness to pay and willingness to accept and the third is 
the problem of embedding which encompasses the scope test (Hausman 2012). The first problem 
is due to the fact that  the interviewees often lack market experience and respond without a real 
perception of the values involved. Another possible cause is the fact that the interviewees  may  
want to please  the interviewer. One solution should be to find an adjustment parameter for the 
willingness to pay, but it  is very difficult to  find such a parameter in a way that is generally 
acceptable.  The second problem  concerns  the differences between WTP and WTA. The theory 
suggests that these two measures must be similar, but  instead authors find disparities most of 
the time between them. (Hausman, 2012).  The third problems: scope and embedding, is the 
most relevant challenge for CV studies. The problem is related to the scope effect (Kahneman 
and Knetsch 1992; Diamond and Housman 1994), where respondents to surveys must be willing 
to pay more for a larger effect than a subset of that effect. There are several studies that apply 
the scope test (Desvousges, Mathews, and Train 2012), but they do not provide sufficient 
information to judge an adequate variation in scope. Furthermore, several studies do not provide 
information for a test implemented by Diamond and Hausman (1994), called “adding-up test”, 
where a group of interviewees is asked the WTP for a good X, another group for the good Y and 
a third group for the good X + Y. The result must be that the WTP for the third group must be 
equal to the sum of the WTP of the first and the second groups. The author states that even if a 
CV study passes the adding-up test there might persist non-coherent or non-stable individual 
preferences (Housman 2012). 
To try to best predict the WTP/A in our study and overcome some of the problems stated above, 
we  propose to use  a “double bounded” question for the preservation of local environment, in 
the rural household surveys. To avoid the problem of overstatement, we  will formulate the 
question in a precise manner on a possible program on environmental and economic 
development and check whether the respondent is favorable or not to be involved in at least one 
of its component by spending a certain amount of money or, alternatively , by receiving a certain 
amount of money in compensation for his involvement. A second question with a proposal of a 
different amount will also be asked to create the double bound. This second question  will 
concern the way (tax, voluntary contribution, user fee, PES) that the interviewee would prefer to 
exercise her WTP/A.  
To address the embedding problem we will ask a further question at the end of the questionnaire 
for each interviewee on her willingness to pay for a development program including all three 
issues environmental conservation, local culture and local economic development. To test for the 
embedding problem, we expect that the WTP for these last set of questions should be greater 
than the first set of questions on WTP, since the latter include just one of the three topics of the 
development program.  
 
 
11. Potential PES schemes for the target region 
 
Option1: Grassland protection Grant scheme 
 
Buyer: Government of Azerbaijan (or UNDP at the pilot stage)  
The PES scheme aims to improve management of private and municipality lands and increase 
public benefits derived from existing mountain landscapes and invest in improving ecosystems 
for additional public benefits. The grant scheme covers only municipalities and registered private 
landowners. According to this scheme, municipalities and registered landowners will apply for 
the grants. These grants include regular payments to landowners for a given time. Landowners 
take an obligation to manage their lands properly. In the application, landowners will be required 
to identify their intentions and commitments with respect to future management and agree on 
land use forms and procedures. For example,  the grantee  can commit to  conserve and manage 
private forest in his/her land. Also, by applying for the grant, municipalities will openly develop 
their future plans with respect to future land use. For example, they can commit hat the   to 
protect and use as forest area a certain  land area.  Alternatively,  on behalf of the municipalities, 
Pasture Users’ Associations  may develop a  participatory land management plan, according to 
which, land will be managed properly, and natural habitat is conserved. Local landowners will 
join into FUAs or PUAs and apply for grants. 
Sellers: Sellers include all the registered landowners and municipalities in the selected area of 
the target region. They will apply for grant support and accept agreement before they will start 
the project. Relevant government bodies (or UNDP at the initial stage) will administer grants.  
Type of ecosystem services provided: This scheme targets protection and management of 
municipality lands, which will provide clean water, reduced risk for floods, recreational use, and 
esthetic and existence value. Improved soil quality will contribute to restoration of vegetation 
cover. Touristic activities in the area will be intensified.  
 
Option2: Establishment of  a National Ecosystem Foundation 
 
 In order to improve management of private and municipality lands and increase public benefits 
derived from existing mountain landscapes, a National Ecosystem Foundation (NEF)  may be 
established. NEF  will be a public body that will work in the whole country, including the target 
region. Recreational hunters, tourists, berry and mushroom gatherers will be the direct users and 
buyers of the  NEF  sponsoredservices. Water users, and other persons   willing to pay for 
existence and option values are counted as the indirect users. All the people that are interested 
in ecosystem protection or protection of species and are ready to pay can be counted as the 
indirect beneficiaries. Main income of the NEF will be donations of the potential buyers.  
Simultaneously, NEF may receive support of international and national donors. 
 
Sellers: Sellers include all the registered landowners and municipalities of the target region.  They 
may apply for the support of NEF or NEF will offer its support to them. Registered landowners or 
municipalities will sign detailed agreement on payments.  
 
Type of ecosystem services provided: Clean water, reduced flood risk, esthetic values, existence 
values, option values, bequest value, recreational services will be provided to buyers. Increased 
touristic activities will give a stimulus to increase donations in the future. 
 
Willingness to pay: Survey is important to assess willingness to pay of people looked over as 
potential buyers.  
 
Option3: Direct government support 
 
Buyer: Government of Azerbaijan (or UNDP at the pilot stage)  
Seller: Local landowners 
 The buyers would like to shield or remove  environmentally sensitive land from use. Planted plant 
species will improve resistance of land and increase quality of ecosystem services. Landowners 
will receive annual rental payments from the government. Contracts for land enrolled in this 
scheme are 10-15 years in length. The long-term goal of the activity is to reestablish valuable land 
cover to help improve ecosystem services and quality of environment, prevent land degradation. 
 
Sellers: Sellers include all the registered landowners and municipalities of the target region.  In 
order to be enrolled in the program, they will apply for government support. Their  PES contracts  
will typically last  10-15 years.  
 
Type of ecosystem services provided: Clean water, reduced flood risk, esthetic values, existence 
values, option values, bequest value, recreational services will be provided  by sellers. Improved 
lands will provide  water that mitigates the impact from debris flows and services that  increase 
water producing ability of landscapes. PES   are equivalent to money transfers. 
 
Option4: Ecosystem subsidies  
 
Buyer: Government of Azerbaijan (or UNDP at the pilot stage)  
Seller: Local landowners 
Subsidies represent money transfers  across economic sectors. They lay  the ground  to make the 
most vulnerable economic sectors to compete with other sectors and to internalize external 
effects of private production. PES in the form of direct subsidies can be used to support farmers 
to change their land use patterns in ways that would enable to protect ecosystems. In most of 
nature conservation programs governments support farmers with subsidies to convert erodible 
lands into sustained agricultural ecosystems that are supported by environmentally friendly 
activities. 
 
In these schemes, landowners are supported  by targeted subsidies. Rather than choosing  
activities on the basis of perceived profits, landowners are  induced to apply environmentally 
friendly practices recommended  by governmental agencies.   For example, farmers may switch 
from cattle-breeding into beekeeping or apply butter-strip plowing. 
 
Sellers: Sellers include all the registered landowners and municipalities of the target region.  In 
order to obtain  the  subsidy, they will need to sign a contract with  the government agency that 
will determine the type of the land use activity to implement. 
 Type of ecosystem services provided: Clean water, reduced flood risk, esthetic values, existence 
values, option values, bequest value, recreational services will be provided to buyers. The 
improved lands will provide water that mitigates the impact from debris flows and increase water 
producing ability of landscapes.  
 
Option 5:  Water trade 
 
Buyer: Azersu Joint Stock Company  
Seller: Local landowners 
 
As noted before, the Girdmanchay river basin is a big potential water source at its lower fan , 
with the Kululu water source   capable to provide 500000 people with high quality drinking water. 
Grasslands and forests have a rather big  role in regulating this source. Recently, Azersu Company 
has been  using this water source to supply downstream towns.   A PES scheme  may aim to 
improve management of private and municipality lands and increase quality of provisioning 
ecosystem services derived from existing ecosystems. Potential buyers will pay upstream farmers 
to improve land use management through changing traditional land use approach. Azersu may 
also involve downstream water users into the payments. For example, increased payments of 
water users may give additional means to payments for ecosystem services. Alternatively, part 
of the payments made by downstream water users could be used to construct sewage treatment 
sites in upstream residential areas. 
Sellers: Sellers include all the registered landowners and municipalities of the target region.  In 
order to be included in the program, farmers will need to make project proposals or accept the 
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